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No Spitting.
No Summary Judgments.
-Sign in the office of a district court in the former Fifth Circuit.
I. Introduction
Word has it that the United States Courts of Appeals are tough on
summary judgments. The district court's sign reflects the perception
that, in practice, the reviewing court turns a strict eye on grants of
summary judgment-perhaps more so in the former Fifth Circuit than
in other circuits, though the verbal formulations are similar, tracking
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1 It also suggests that standards of
review--catch phrases meant to guide the appellate court in approach-
ing both the issues and parties before it and the trial court's earlier
procedure or result-really affect subsequent courts, trial and appel-
late, in doing their job.
The trial court's sardonic sign at least illustrates two tines of a
fork that must be kept in mind when the concept of "standards of re-
view" is approached. First, practice counts more than words. Standards
are not self-actualizing; for example, what is a "material fact?" And
the formulations do not say much until the appeals court, in discussion
and practice, gives them life.
Second, words may control or frame the practice. The ubiquitous
standard, either in basic form or as defined and refined, is presented as
a meaningful guidepost to frame the arguments to the appellate court
and that court's analytical response. Even if the catch phrases have no
real internal meaning, in many cases it is clear that the issue-framing
or assignment of power behind the words is the turning point of the
decision. 2 That many panels take the scope of review seriously is illus-
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 56. The courts must find that no material facts are left for
trial resolution. See infra note 286.
2. See, e.g., text accompanying infra notes 143-45 (debate over "some evidence"
rule).
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trated by conclusions like the one tagged on a recent case: "This case
does not present a model of proof of the statutory employer defense.
Our review is, however, strictly circumscribed by the posture of this
appeal. We cannot find plain error on this record." 3
The importance of the review posture is also implicit in the num-
ber of cases in this article which had to be resolved by the full en banc
court before the standard was settled. Additionally, the Supreme Court
has seen fit recently to step into the picture to preserve the "buckler
and shield ' 4 of the clearly erroneous rule against perceived evasion by
the former en banc Fifth Circuit.5 Even that decision was not without
strong disagreement.6
Even where review authority controls, however, it is not clear how
much of the structuring is really found inside the standard of review
phrases.7 Sometimes the intricacies are nonsensical; how can a jury in a
criminal case convict on insufficient evidence (the normal review) with-
out doing a miscarriage of justice (the test where counsel had not
moved for acquittal)?8 Of course the tests may turn out to be a practi-
cal fiction-shorthand which ultimately does not control the appellate
decision-making process. Just when it is "obvious" that the standard
determines outcome, the next panel may routinely recite the proper
3. Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715 F.2d 983, 989 (5th Cir. 1983). See infra
notes 272-79.
4. Horton v. United States Steel Corp., 286 F.2d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1961).
5. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982)(discussed infra notes 90-93
and accompanying text). Of course in some situations limited review is a constitutional
restriction. E.g., U.S. CONST. amend. VII (discussed infra note 136).
6. See Swint, 456 U.S. at 293 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The case also illustrates
the confusion that at times exists in this area, the court noting that the former Fifth
Circuit opinion spoke of the inappplicability of the clearly erroneous rule while simulta-
neously applying language associated with the test. See id. at 290.
7. See generally Levinson, Law as Literature, 60 TEx. L. REv. 373 (1982). For
example, the "substantial evidence" test for review of facts in formal administrative
actions has been likened to the core of a seedless grape. See also W. GELLHORN, C.
BYSE & P. STRAUSS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 269 (7th ed. 1979) and infra note 135.
8. Cf. infra note 187 and accompanying text (review of civil verdict absent di-
rected verdict motion). Judge Anderson made a similar observation in United States v.
Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 1982)(en banc)(concurring opinion), aff'd, 462 U.S.
356 (1983), noting: "To say that the evidence is sufficient if a 'reasonable trier of fact
could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt' is not substan-
tively different from saying that the 'evidence was inconsistent with every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence.'" Id. (citations omitted). The majority nevertheless rejected
the "hypothesis of innocence" formulation for ordinary review of criminal convictions.
See id. at 548-49.
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language but apparently decide the case in its own way.
The problem is of course not unusual in a common law system,
where judges are always human in applying and interpreting legal
rules. Yet while it is easy to say the "guideposts" are meaningless post-
hoc rationalizations, most courts present them as restricting or freeing
their reviewing scope at least in a general way. Similarly, witness our
surprise when we realize that John Hinckley's jury actually followed its
prescribed guiding formulation in finding that the government had not
met its federal sanity burden.9
In addition to the problem of finding the true meaning and value
of the standard of review notion, two further problems quickly appear.
First, the courts in general, and the Eleventh Circuit at times, have not
always been uniform in their recitation and application of the specific
tests."0 Second, even with an established standard, the term of the stan-
dard usually defies definition. One senses the circular difficulties a court
had in explaining "abuse of discretion": "In a legal sense, discretion is
abused whenever in the exercise of its discretion the court exceeds the
bounds of reason, all of the circumstances before it being considered."' 1
Further definition and discussion often adds nothing and is no
more helpful than the term itself. "Clearly erroneous," for example, is
probably clear enough (or as clear as such a non-mathematical concept
allows) without the reams of garnishing and explanation courts have
offered . 2 Yet the bonus definition, as law, cannot be ignored by subse-
quent courts, practicing attorneys, or exploring scholars..
Perhaps all the standards and elaboration could be reduced to
three or four such standards-no deference, some deference, high def-
erence, scepticism. Or as Professor Rosenberg has classified, "[a]ll ap-
pellate Gaul, the trial judge would say, is divided into three parts: re-
view of facts, review of law, and review of discretion."' 3 Despite the
9. See Stone, The Insanity Defense on Trial, 33 HARv. L.S. BULL. 15, 16-17
(1982). But the Supreme Court has recited deference of "great weight" to an agency's
interpretive ruling while, finding itself in disagreement with that view, rejecting it. E.g.,
Inv. Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971). The "great weight" becomes less deferen-
tial with the blurry qualification: "great weight to any reasonable construction .... .
Id. at 626 (emphasis added). See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE
§§ 7:10, 7:11 (2d ed. 1979).
10. See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text.
11. Berry v. Chaplin, 74 Cal. App. 2d 669, 672, 169 P.2d 453 (1946).
12. See infra notes 31-50 and accompanying text.
13. Rosenberg, Appellate Review of Trial Court Discretion, 79 F.R.D. 173, 173
(1978).
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room for simplification in this area, however, it must be noted that the
tests also often define what materials the reviewing court looks to, in
addition to the scope of its review. In practice the standards appear to
have some real value: to guide the process, to tip the balance to one
side, to direct the court to common points of departure which are al-
ready deemed relevant. At least the standards are useful to organize an
argument or holding, or to give a common language of appellate scope.
Standards may even assign or reflect the power distribution between
reviewing and "lower" court.
Whatever the actual value or use of standards of review, most
cases on appeal set out the test appropriate for the particular issue. The
smart attorney and the careful court is likely to cite or discuss the stan-
dard and its application to the issues at hand.14 Standards, whatever
their substance, have strategic value in appellate practice because they
"indicate the decibel level at which the appellate advocate must play to
catch the judicial ear." 15 For example, counsel for appellant in a recent
case challenged the trial court's finding as clearly erroneous-an ambi-
tious effort-apparently adopting that test in light of the Supreme
Court's strict application in Pullman-Standard v. Swint.16 The attorney
need not have conceded that deferential standard, however, since a
strong argument was available that the finding at issue was a "mixed"
question of law and fact, possibly subject to stricter review even under
Swint.17 By sliding over the standard of review issue, counsel could
have lost the chance to have the appellate court stir more freely in the
trial court's soup. Even a topic as routine as the proper standard, then,
may turn out to be a vital issue on appeal.
This article is offered as a guidebook to the standards used to re-
view various decisions based on particular situations at trial in civil and
habeas cases. The article reviews the several standards, their meanings,
their applications, and their differences. Although this guide empha-
sizes Eleventh Circuit and former Fifth Circuit cases and language,
many of the general tests and analyses are standard fare among all the
circuits. Former Fifth Circuit precedent is particularly telling for the
Eleventh Circuit, for which former Fifth Circuit precedent rules until
14. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REv.
869, 872 (1983)("Start the brief by stating briefly the applicable standard of review.").
15. Id. at 873.
16. 456 U.S. at 273.
17. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
1985]
7
Childress: Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
an Eleventh Circuit en banc court overrules.'" Lawyer or court may
wish to follow the categories to find the proper tests--cases often in-
volve several-or doctrinal debate. The cited standard may sound com-
mon but have a twist, in language or practice, which distinguishes it
from a similar situation.' 9 This summary, then, may serve as a helpful
reference: where the review issue is not crucial or complex, it can be
addressed and passed; where it counts, this guidebook may present a
first step and point to a meaningful direction.
This article, however, is meant to be more than a completed peg-
and-hole set or a purely practical list. Cases are often conflicting, un-
clear, or skimpy on the rules and their bases. The historical develop-
ment and intent of the standards is neglected. Other authorities are
lacking, as substantive articles discuss and promote legal issues as if
they were decided in an appellate vacuum, little attention given to the
decision-making context of the issues or the assignment of power and
roles among courts. These areas demand beginning analysis and
questioning.
This guidebook, then, may also serve as a starting point for further
inquiry, by court and commentator, into the propriety of various tests
in theory and application. Courts may wish to shore up inconsistencies.
Scholars may begin to ask what these standards mean and how they
affect the judicial process on appeal or, in turn, at trial. Standards of
review, like chemical catalysts, must act on something, and usually that
something is more important in the final analysis. Nevertheless, the
guideposts are useful in practice, and also raise substantial questions
about the legal system in general. The article is presented to lawyer,
court, and scholar alike as a helpful Eleventh Circuit guide and
springboard.
18. Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)(en
banc)(the Eleventh Circuit specifically adopting Fifth Circuit precedent prior to Octo-
ber 1, 1981).
19. Factors commonly affecting the appropriate standard include: objections and
waivers, presumptions and burdens, appellant versus appellee, fact versus law, criminal
versus civil, and judge versus jury. This article attempts to categorize along these and
other lines.
Similarly, the article compares other circuits' tests and rules in some divergent or
illustrative situations. Although the general principles often apply nationally, specific
applications sometimes differ among and within the circuits, and conflicts exist beyond
the general statements of the broadly applicable standard. See generally S. CHILDRESS
& M. DAVIS, STANDARDS OF REVIEW (forthcoming 1986).
264 [Vol. 9
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II. Civil Appeals
A. Findings in a Bench Trial
1. Findings of Fact
a. Development of the Clearly Erroneous Rule
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
uneasy dichotomy existed between the standard applied in reviewing
equity findings and the one reserved for those actions based in law but
for which, as permitted by Congress since 1865, a jury had been
waived. In nonjury legal actions the judge was seen as both judge and
jury, and his findings of fact were considered as conclusive as a jury
verdict, which had long been strictly protected by the seventh amend-
ment. Equity review, on the other hand, was traditionally
broader--only a self-imposed restraint-though more restrictive than
that used in admiralty. Equity in fact applied three tests, varying the
strength of "presumptively correct" where the evidence to be reviewed
was oral, undisputed documentary, or disputed documentary.20
The merger of law and equity in 1934 further complicated this
divergence. Although it was accepted that law and equity would then
require the same standard, the profession hotly debated whether that
test should be imported from former legal practice or from "the" stan-
dard used in equity practice. In the end the broader equity test pre-
vailed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though a draft stating it
explicitly--"the same effect as heretofore given to findings in suits in
equity" 2 -was rejected in an effort to avoid the uncertainty surround-
ing prior equity practice. In addition, the Advisory Committee at-
tempted to bring uniformity to the equity test by stating that the new
rule would be "applicable in all classes of findings," regardless of the
documentary or testimonial nature of the fact found.22
20. See Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 411-
13 (1981); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Errone-
ous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 69-72 & nn.10-11 (1977).
21. Note, supra note 20, at 72-75 & n.22. The Advisory Committee made clear,
however, that the equity test was the chosen one. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
22. Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
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b. Rule 52 and Applicability
The result was the now-famous clearly erroneous rule formulated
for equity and law courts in Rule 52.23 Rule 52(a) requires the trial
court to separate and spell out its fact findings and conclusions of law.
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous ... "-
This rule applies to review of standard civil cases and equity ac-
tions, as well as to admiralty cases,25 and to habeas corpus appeals.26
The rule on its face applies to findings made by a judge aided by an
advisory jury as though there were no jury.27 "The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court. 28 Similarly, fact findings of a bankruptcy judge,
affirmed by the district court, are to be credited unless clearly errone-
ous. 29 Rule 52(a) by its own terms does not require the district court to
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). One brief filed with the Fifth Circuit demonstrated
sarcasm about, or ignorance of, the ubiquitous nature of the rule. It argued that the
"findings below are, to coin a phrase, clearly erroneous."
24. Id.
25. See 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE % 52.03[11] &
nn.3, 26 (2d ed. 1977). Admiralty review was traditionally de novo, but the Supreme
Court extended "clear error" review in 1954. See McAllister v. United States, 348
U.S. 19 (1954). In 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were made generally
applicable to admiralty. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Note, supra note 20, at 70 n.11.
26. See infra notes 124-26, 372-78, and accompanying text.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A 1946 amendment clarified the rule's applicability, as
originally intended, to the advisory jury situation.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2)(in nonjury actions the
district court, before further hearing, shall accept master's findings unless clearly erro-
neous); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 523 F.2d 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1975)(distinguishing spe-
cific reference under Rule 53(c) from other Rule 53 situations). Review is less clear,
however, for findings of a magistrate referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Findings
under §§ 636(b)(1) and 636(b)(3) may be subject to "de novo determination." See
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). But recently a court has declined such
free review in a case referred under § 636(b)(2). See Miss. River Grain Elevator, Inc.
v. Bartlett & Co., 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677
F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B)(en banc)(failure to file objections in a § 636(b)(1)
proceeding does not waive right to appeal district court's conclusions of law, but there
is no de novo review of an issue covered in the report, and adopted facts are not re-
versed absent plain error or manifest injustice).
29. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). See Northern Pipe-line Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 n.5 (1982). The court's plan or provi-
sions, however, have been reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" test. See In re Brad-
ley, 705 F.2d 1409, 1411 (5th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy referral situation is, of
course, in a state of flux, both with the institution of a new system under the Bank-
266 [Vol. 9
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state its findings and conclusions on decisions under Rules 12 or 56.
But the court dismissing plaintiff's case on the merits under Rule 41(b)
is subject to Rule 52(a).10
c. Definition
i. Gypsum: "Mistake"
Soon after Rule 52(a) was adopted, the Supreme Court in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co. defined "clear error," offering this
formulation: "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when although there is
evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left
with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been commit-
ted."'" The language of this definition has become standard fare in sub-
sequent Supreme Court opinions. 2 Most of the Eleventh Circuit prece-
dent which defines "clearly erroneous" follows the Gypsum formula in
applying Rule 52(a).33 And Gypsum's "mistake" definition has itself
been "defined": "Where the evidence would support a conclusion either
way, a choice by the trial judge between two permissible views of the
weight of the evidence is not clearly erroneous . . . ." Review is
made, at any rate, by considering the evidence as a whole.35
ruptey Code and the adjustments made to maintain the constitutionality of the refer-
rals in light of recent Supreme Court pronouncement.
30. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Denial of a Rule 41(b) motion has the effect of carry-
ing it with the case and entering judgment on the merits at the close of the evidence.
See Rigel Fiber Corp. v. Anderson Gin Co., 512 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1975). See also
infra note 306.
31. 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948). In Gypsum the Court, on direct appeal, rejected
the trial court's findings. Id. at 396.
32. E.g., Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 74 n.19
(1978); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123 (1969);
Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 291 (1960); McAllister v. United States,
348 U.S. 19, 20 (1954).
33. E.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Citibank Group, Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir.
1984); United States ex reL G.E. Supply Co. v. Wiring, Inc., 646 F.2d 1037, 1041 (5th
Cir. 1981); Ferrero v. United States, 603 F.2d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1979); Hague v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir. 1978); Chaney v. City of Galveston,
368 F.2d 774 (5th Cir. 1966).
34. Chaney, 368 F.2d at 776.
35. Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 395 ("entire evidence"). Although the Supreme Court
would appear to have settled this issue, the Seventh Circuit once erroneously indicated
that the reviewing court looks to the evidence most favorable to the findings. See Uni-
royal v. Mumford, 454 F.2d 1233, 1236 (7th Cir. 1972).
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ii. Sanders v. Leech: "Truth and Right"
The standard, unfortunately, is not so clearly and consistently con-
strued in many former Fifth Circuit opinions.38 One line of cases con-
tinues to use a pre-Gypsum three-pronged test, reversing where: (1)
findings are unsupported by substantial evidence; (2) the court "misap-
prehended" effect of the evidence; or (3) although there is evidence
which if credible would be substantial, the "force and effect of the tes-
timony as a whole convinces that the finding is so against the great
preponderance of the credible testimony that it does not reflect or re-
present the truth and right of the case."'37 The circuit formulated this
test prior to Gypsum in Sanders v. Leech, which held that the review-
ing court may reverse in the three situations above, but warned that "it
is not for the appellate court to substitute its judgment on disputed
issues of fact for that of the trial court where there is substantial credi-
ble evidence to support the finding." ' Of course the Sanders test, espe-
cially in its "truth and right" incarnation, is not wholly inconsistent
with the Gypsum approach. (The warning to appellate courts not to
substitute their own judgments is prevalent in both lines of cases, for
example.) In fact, some cases cite both Gypsum and Sanders as prece-
dent without discussing possible differences.39 Others seem to allow the
appeals court a choice, as an "either/or. 4 °
Nevertheless, opinions which cite both tests tend to blur rather
than reconcile. Some interpret Sanders' "truth and right" test as re-
stating Gypsum's "mistake" test.4' One case says that Gypsum man-
36. Divergent definition is an observation or criticism separate from any inconsis-
tency in applying the standard. See infra text accompanying notes 51, 100-132. Cf.
Note, supra note 20, at 68 (controversy is not over whether findings are in fact clearly
erroneous but over the language of the rule, especially where credibility is involved).
37. Western Cottonoil Co. v. Hodges, 218 F.2d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 1954)(citing
Sanders v. Leech, 158 F.2d 486 (5th Cir. 1946)).
38. 158 F.2d 486, 487 (5th Cir. 1946).
39. See, e.g., Lincoln v. Bd. of Regents, 697 F.2d 928, 940 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, -U.S.-, 104 S.Ct. 97 (1984); Neal v. Saga Shipping Co., 407 F.2d 481,
484, 488 (5th Cir. 1969)(damages plainly out of measure so as to be clearly
erroneous).
40. E.g., Blum v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 418 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir.
1969)(findings supported by substantial credible evidence), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1040
(1970); Franks v. Nat'l Dairy Products Corp., 414 F.2d 682, 684 (5th Cir. 1969).
41. See, e.g., Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th
Cir.)("in other words ... truth and right"), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Arm-
strong Cork Co. v. World Carpets, Inc., 597 F.2d 496, 501, 506 (5th Cir. 1979), cert.
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II. Civil Appeals
A. Findings in a Bench Trial
1. Findings of Fact
a. Development of the Clearly Erroneous Rule
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, an
uneasy dichotomy existed between the standard applied in reviewing
equity findings and the one reserved for those actions based in law but
for which, as permitted by Congress since 1865, a jury had been
waived. In nonjury legal actions the judge was seen as both judge and
jury, and his findings of fact were considered as conclusive as a jury
verdict, which had long been strictly protected by the seventh amend-
ment. Equity review, on the other hand, was traditionally
broader-only a self-imposed restraint-though more restrictive than
that used in admiralty. Equity in fact applied three tests, varying the
strength of "presumptively correct" where the evidence to be reviewed
was oral, undisputed documentary, or disputed documentary.20
The merger of law and equity in 1934 further complicated this
divergence. Although it was accepted that law and equity would then
require the same standard, the profession hotly debated whether that
test should be imported from former legal practice or from "the" stan-
dard used in equity practice. In the end the broader equity test pre-
vailed in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, though a draft stating it
explicitly-"the same effect as heretofore given to findings in suits in
equity" 2 -- was rejected in an effort to avoid the uncertainty surround-
ing prior equity practice. In addition, the Advisory Committee at-
tempted to bring uniformity to the equity test by stating that the new
rule would be "applicable in all classes of findings," regardless of the
documentary or testimonial nature of the fact found.22
20. See Nangle, The Ever Widening Scope of Fact Review in Federal Appellate
Courts-Is the "Clearly Erroneous Rule" Being Avoided?, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 409, 411-
13 (1981); Note, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the Scope of Appellate
Fact Review: Has Application of the Clearly Erroneous Rule Been Clearly Errone-
ous?, 52 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 68, 69-72 & nn.10-11 (1977).
21. Note, supra note 20, at 72-75 & n.22. The Advisory Committee made clear,
however, that the equity test was the chosen one. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
See also United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 394-95 (1948).
22. Nangle, supra note 20, at 414-15.
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b. Rule 52 and Applicability
The result was the now-famous clearly erroneous rule formulated
for equity and law courts in Rule 52.23 Rule 52(a) requires the trial
court to separate and spell out its fact findings and conclusions of law.
"Findings of fact shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. ... "I',
This rule applies to review of standard civil cases and equity ac-
tions, as well as to admiralty cases,25 and to habeas corpus appeals.26
The rule on its face applies to findings made by a judge aided by an
advisory jury as though there were no jury.27 "The findings of a master,
to the extent that the court adopts them, shall be considered as the
findings of the court."' 28 Similarly, fact findings of a bankruptcy judge,
affirmed by the district court, are to be credited unless clearly errone-
ous.29 Rule 52(a) by its own terms does not require the district court to
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). One brief filed with the Fifth Circuit demonstrated
sarcasm about, or ignorance of, the ubiquitous nature of the rule. It argued that the
"findings below are, to coin a phrase, clearly erroneous."
24. Id.
25. See 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 52.03[l] &
nn.3, 26 (2d ed. 1977). Admiralty review was traditionally de novo, but the Supreme
Court extended "clear error" review in 1954. See McAllister v. United States, 348
U.S. 19 (1954). In 1966 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were made generally
applicable to admiralty. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. See Note, supra note 20, at 70 n.1 1.
26. See infra notes 124-26, 372-78, and accompanying text.
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). A 1946 amendment clarified the rule's applicability, as
originally intended, to the advisory jury situation.
28. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a). Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(2)(in nonjury actions the
district court, before further hearing, shall accept master's findings unless clearly erro-
neous); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 523 F.2d 917, 921-22 (1st Cir. 1975)(distinguishing spe-
cific reference under Rule 53(c) from other Rule 53 situations). Review is less clear,
however, for findings of a magistrate referred under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Findings
under §§ 636(b)(1) and 636(b)(3) may be subject to "de novo determination." See
United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980). But recently a court has declined such
free review in a case referred under § 636(b)(2). See Miss. River Grain Elevator, Inc.
v. Bartlett & Co., 659 F.2d 1314 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Nettles v. Wainwright, 677
F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1982)(Unit B)(en banc)(failure to file objections in a § 636(b)(1)
proceeding does not waive right to appeal district court's conclusions of law, but there
is no de novo review of an issue covered in the report, and adopted facts are not re-
versed absent plain error or manifest injustice).
29. In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983). See Northern Pipe-line Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S. 50, 55 n.5 (1982). The court's plan or provi-
sions, however, have been reviewed under an "abuse of discretion" test. See In re Brad-
ley, 705 F.2d 1409, 1411 (5th Cir. 1983). The bankruptcy referral situation is, of
course, in a state of flux, both with the institution of a new system under the Bank-
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ward expanded review-either in practical application or through ma-
nipulation of the test(s). Broader review of fact findings is criticized for
increasing appeals, undermining confidence in the judicial system, and
demoralizing district judges. 51 This charged "circumvention" of Rule
52 is seen as especially marked where the issue of demeanor evidence
or inferences is involved.
e. Demeanor and Documentary Evidence
The district judge is often recognized as having a superior position
from which to judge the facts. Thus, "credibility choices and the reso-
lution of conflicting testimony are within the province of the court sit-
ting without a jury, subject only to the clearly erroneous rule of Rule
52(a). 52 The rule recognizes this deference: "Findings of fact shall not
be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to
the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the wit-
nesses."5 3 The implication is that the appellate court must apply the
standard especially carefully when reviewing demeanor testimony.54
This warning has been termed a stronger burden55 or a "special
reluctance."56
Despite the original intent that the clearly erroneous rule be ap-
plied to all types of evidence57 and the plain language of the "due re-
gard" caution, many courts have reversed the logic, allowing "clear er-
ror" to be more readily found for documentary evidence, undisputed
testimony, and depositions. In those situations, early Fifth Circuit
panels held that the rule did not apply at all 58 or that "the burden is
51. See Nangle, supra note 20, at 409-11, 418, 426-29; Wright, The Doubtful
Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779-81 (1957). But see Note,
supra note 20, at 80-81, 84-85 (more recently trend is toward stricter and more uni-
form application, especially by Supreme Court and former Fifth Circuit). See also
supra note 36 (inconsistency in applying Rule 52).
52. Rodriguez v. Jones, 473 F.2d 599, 604 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 953
(1973).
53. FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
54. See Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394, 396.
55. See Galena Oaks Corp. v. Scofield, 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 52 advisory committee note of 1955, quoted in J. MOORE &
J. LUCAS, supra note 25, 1 52.01[07] (unadopted amendment to Rule 52).
57. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
58. See Frazier v. Alabama Motor Club, Inc., 349 F.2d 456, 458 (5th Cir.
1965). Other cases at the same time strictly applied the rule. See, e.g., Welch, 345 F.2d
at 943-44.
1985]
15
Childress: Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
lighter, much lighter," to show clear error.59 Today the standard
formula in the Eleventh and Fifth Circuits holds that, though the rule
still applies where credibility is not involved, "the burden of establish-
ing clear error is not so heavy, and the clearly erroneous rule is some-
what ameliorated ... .
The policy behind somewhat freer review in such situations, echo-
ing the three-part standard formerly used in equity, is clear: the ap-
peals court considers itself to sit in a vantage point as good as the trial
court's. While the Supreme Court over the years has in practice and
definition applied Rule 52(a) across-the-board, it has occasionally used
dicta which support those declining to give up the demeanor distinction
of old equity, noting that the rationale behind the rule is of less mo-
ment where the evidence is mostly documentary.6 1 Additionally, recent
Court dicta seem to endorse fully the Eleventh Circuit's intermediate
approach. 2
Extended review has, however, been strongly criticized for flip-
flopping the intent of Rule 52(a) and usurping the trial court's func-
tion." The approaches taken among and within the circuits are not al-
ways consistent,6 4 and the Eighth Circuit has recently held that it is not
59. Galena Oaks, 218 F.2d at 219. See also Pennsylvania T. & M. Mut. Cas.
Co. v. Crapet, 199 F.2d 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1952).
60. Seaboard Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Trailer Train Co., 690 F.2d 1343, 1349
(11 th Cir. 1982). See also Onaway Transportation Co. v. Offshore Tugs, Inc., 695 F.2d
197, 200 (5th Cir. 1983); Hague v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 571 F.2d 262, 264 (5th Cir.
1978)("somewhat lessened"); Burston v. Caldwell, 506 F.2d 24 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 990 (1975); Sicula Oceanica, S.A. v. Wilmar Marine Eng. & Sales Corp.,
413 F.2d 1332, 1333-34 (5th Cir. 1969)("not as heavy").
61. See United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, 141-42 (1966).
62. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, - U.S. -, 104 S.
Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984). But in 1985 the Court reiterated strict application of the rule,
even in paper cases. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 71, 74
(1985).
63. See, e.g., Clark, Special Problems in Drafting and Interpreting Procedural
Codes and Rules, 3 VAND. L. REV. 493, 505-06 (1950)("by a process almost inveterate
in legal thinking, a negative was soon deduced as the opposite of the affirmations; and
now the definitely erroneous gloss is being stated in place of the rule itself"). See gener-
ally Wright, supra note 51; Note, Rule 52(a): Appellate Review of Findings of Fact
Based on Documentary or Undisputed Evidence, 49 VA. L. REv. 506 (1963). Even
where the reviewing court is as competent, its function may not be to reinterpret a
"cold" record. Note, supra note 20, at 90.
64. See Note, supra note 20, at 79-85. Presently the Supreme Court and most
circuits endorse application of the rule regardless of the class of evidence. Id. at 79-80
& n.56. See generally Anderson, - U.S. at -, 105 S. Ct. at 74.
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bound at all by findings based on paper evidence. 65 Nevertheless,
Professors Wright and Miller have noted a "marked trend" toward
strict application of the rule to all fact findings.66 The Eleventh and
Fifth Circuit test has become relatively settled, 7 allowing a middle-
ground approach in which the class of evidence may be considered, but
the clearly erroneous rule still applies.
f. Verbatim Adoption
A special problem is presented when the district court's findings
are directly adopted from a brief or submission of one party, since the
reviewing court cannot see the discerning factors or be assured that the
trial court has faced the conflicts inherent in adjudication. While the
former Fifth Circuit "has consistently expressed its disapproval of the
practice," 68 it nonetheless applies Rule 52(a) to such findings, with a
qualification similar to that used for documentary evidence. The court
"can take into account the District Court's lack of personal attention to
factual findings in applying the clearly erroneous rule.'"69 Then the "ap-
pellate court can feel slightly more confident in concluding that impor-
tant evidence has been overlooked or inadequately considered .... ,,70
65. Gay Lib v. University of Mo., 558 F.2d 848, 853 n.10 (8th Cir. 1977), reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 1080 (1978).
66. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2587, at
748-49 (1971).
67. Note, supra note 20, at 84-85. The circuit's position has been repeatedly in-
voked despite the Supreme Court's generally broad reading of the clear error rule ex-
pressed recently in Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). The flexible review given nondemeanor
evidence, however, is put forth as a variation on, not an abrogation of, Rule 52, so that
it is apparently distinguished from the discredited "ultimate facts" exception. See infra
text accompanying notes 87-93. Pre-Swint cases do not always carefully distinguish the
two situations, leaving it unclear whether the freer review was based on paper evidence
or on inferences which the appellate court was entitled to draw. See, e.g., Galena Oaks,
218 F.2d at 219. Now, however, the court apparently sees its demeanor variation as
permissible and separate from the prior review given inferences.
68. Keystone Plastics, Inc. v. C&P Plastics, Inc., 506 F.2d 960, 962 (5th Cir.
1975).
69. Amstar v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 899 (1980). See also Wilson v. Thompson, 593 F.2d 1375, 1384 n.16 (5th
Cir. 1979); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Jahre, 472 F.2d 557, 559 (5th Cir. 1973).
70. James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 314 n.1 (5th Cir.
1977)(quoting Louis Dreyfus & Cie. v. Panama Canal Co., 298 F.2d 733, 738 (5th
Cir. 1962)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978). For a thorough discussion of the
problems and permissible uses of mechanical adoptions, see Ramey Construction Co. v.
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Other circuits, including the First and Ninth, turn an even more
critical appellate eye.7 1 But the Supreme Court's early observations are
consistent with the present Eleventh Circuit approach: "The findings
leave much to be desired in light of the function of the trial court. But
they are nonetheless the findings of the District Court. And they must
stand or fall depending on whether they are supported by evidence. We
think they are."'7 2 The courts may be more willing to accept (or other-
wise to reject) adopted findings in cases involving highly technical
facts. 73 On the other hand, future courts may be more reluctant to ac-
cept findings adopted by a special master; cases often emphasize the
special burdens on district judges, adoption thwarts the purpose of a
special reference, and the appellate court may flinch at facing two
levels of verbatim adoption.
g. No Findings and Faulty Findings
Where the district court has failed to make Rule 52 findings, the
Supreme Court has noted that
the usual rule is that there should be a remand for further proceed-
ings to permit the trial court to make the missing find-
ings. . . .Likewise,where findings are infirm because of an errone-
ous view of the law, a remand is the proper course unless the
record permits only one resolution of the factual issue.74
In the Eleventh Circuit a similar rule has been applied to inade-
quate or conclusory findings which do not reveal the trial court's ana-
lytical process. In such a case, remand for more specific findings is rou-
tine, but "[this failure is merely a hindrance and not a fatal error,"
since the appellate court can make the factual collation, in the interest
Apache Tribe, 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980).
71. See, e.g., In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d 1005, 1008-10 (Ist Cir.
1970)("maximum doubt"). Cf. Heterochemical Corp. v. United States Rubber Co.,
368 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1966)(calling it a "practical and wise custom").
72. United States v. Crescent Amusement Co., 323 U.S. 173, 185 (1944). See
also United States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651, 656 n.4 (1964).
73. See In re Las Colinas, Inc., 426 F.2d at 1009-10 (such as patent appeals).
74. Swint, 456 U.S. at 291-92 (1982). Cf. Mason v. Balkcom, 531 F.2d 717 (5th
Cir. 1976)(harmless error for failure to find facts specially). See generally 5A J.
MOORE & J. LuCAS, supra note 25, § 52.06[2] (1982), cited in Swint, 456 U.S. at 292
n.22. For fact findings based on legal error, see infra text accompanying notes 83-85.
See also Swint, 456 U.S. at 298-99 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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of judicial economy, where the record fully establishes the pertinent
facts.7 5 Chief Judge Godbold of the Eleventh Circuit has observed that
"[c]ourts of appeals, at least those in the federal system, are properly
capable of making findings of fact in a broad range of circumstances,
and in practice they actually do so. '"76 Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court's recent reminder that remand to the fact-finding body is the
normally appropriate procedure may check the circuit's use or develop-
ment of fact-finding economies.
2. 'Conclusions of Law
a. Errors: Law or Fact?
Errors of law are not insulated by the clearly erroneous rule and
are freely reviewable. 7 Such a statement is not very helpful since the
threshold question, whether the finding is factual or a legal conclusion,
depends on the case law on that issue and, at times, the facts of the
case. 7 8 The cases offer little general guidance into the fact-law distinc-
tion beyond specific determinations in individual situations. Justice
Brennan offers that fact questions are those for which resolution is
"based ultimately on the application of the fact-finding tribunal's expe-
75. Continental Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 191 (5th Cir.)(quoting Whitley v.
Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698, 700 (5th Cir. 1980)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 830 (1981).
Even after Swint, the circuit has found appellate fact-finding to be proper and neces-
sary in appropriate circumstances. See, e.g., Scott v. Wainwright, 698 F.2d 427, 429
(11 th Cir. 1983). See also Pegues v. Mississippi State Employment, 699 F.2d 760, 766
n.7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, -. U.S.-., 104 S. Ct. 482 (1983); United States v. Ga.
Power Co., 695 F.2d 890 (5th Cir. 1983).
76. Godbold, Fact Finding by Appellate Courts-An Available and Appropriate
Power, 12 CUMB. L. REV. 365, 365(1982). Chief Judge Godbold surveys the appellate
fact-finding function, including receiving new evidence, and discusses its propriety,
economies, and limits.
77. E.g., Swint, 456 U.S. at 287; Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 394; United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968). Appellate courts are foremost, of course,
law courts. For example, the question whether specific conduct is constitutionally pro-
tected is ultimately an issue of law. See generally Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 193
n.3 (1972).
For the principles underlying the "rule of law" controlling in any case, especially
panel stare decisis, see infra notes 348-54 and accompanying text.
78. See generally 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 25, % 52.03[1] n.26. See
infra text accompanying notes 98-132 for various law, fact, and "mixed" categoriza-
tions used in the former Fifth Circuit and in the Eleventh Circuit.
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rience with the mainsprings of human conduct. . . ."9 Judge Friendly
has observed, "what a court can determine better than a jury [is] per-
haps about the only satisfactory criterion for distinguishing 'law' from
'fact.' "80
b. State Law and Foreign Law
Federal courts defer, of course, to interpretations of state law by
state courts, especially the state's highest court. Where no controlling
precedent exists, the court is to decide the case as it believes the state
courts would."' Although review of a district court's construction of law
is normally an unbounded job of the appellate court, some courts note
their deference to an interpretation made by a district judge exper-
ienced in the law of the state in which he or she sits.82 Rule 44.1 pro-
vides for the use of foreign law in the district courts, allowing them to
consider broad sources in determining it. "The court's determination
shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law."8 3
79. Duberstein, 363 U.S. at 289. See also L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF AD-
MINISTRATIVE ACTION 548 (1965); NLRB v. Marcus Trucking Co., 286 F.2d 583 (2d
Cir. 1961). See infra note 292.
80. United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 431 (2d Cir. 1974).
81. See Green v. Amerada-Hess Corp., 612 F.2d 212, 214 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 449 U.S. 952 (1980).. Thus, federal courts are not bound by intermediate state
court rulings if they are convinced that the highest court of the state would decide
otherwise. See Comm'r v. Bosch's Estate, 387 U.S. 456 (1967). The latest and most
authoritative expression of state law applicable to the facts of the case controls. See
Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 503 F.2d 239, 245 (5th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975). See also Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483, 488
(2d Cir. 1971)(proper to refer to "majority rule" when applicable state law is
uncertain).
The Supreme Court has approved certification for determination of state law
where the state so provides. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 389 (1974). The
procedure "helps build a cooperative judicial federalism." Id. at 391.
82. E.g., Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967). See
also Rudd-Melikian, Inc. v. Merritt, 282 F.2d 924, 929 (6th Cir. 1960)(district court's
"permissible" construction of state law in diveristy cases is to be accepted even though
the reviewing court disagrees). Cf. Gee v. Tenneco, Inc., 615 F.2d 857, 861 (9th Cir.
1980)(district judge not overruled on question of state law unless "clearly wrong").
83. FED. R. CIv. P. 44.1. The Advisory Notes specifically recognize that the final
sentence makes inapplicable the clearly erroneous rule.
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c. Findings Based on Faulty Law
Findings of fact based on an erroneous view of the law or an incor-
rect legal standard are not binding on the appellate court. 84 Although
this rule has been standard in the circuit, it was not always clear
whether the courts were "freely reviewing" such findings or whether
the findings were, because of the mistake of law, "clearly erroneous."
An early case implied the latter-that the rule is another facet of Rule
52.85 But most cases, especially recently, find that in such a situation
Rule 52 insulation no longer applies. 8
d. Inferences and "Ultimate Facts"
Although the cases were by no means uniform, the former Fifth
Circuit traditionally considered itself as free to reject findings of "ulti-
mate fact" or inference as where the error was one of law.87 Where the
district court's error goes to the heart of the legal issue, it was ar-gued,
the finding, though ostensibly one of fact, should not be protecteu. This
doctrine was first adopted and defined by the court in Galena Oaks
Corporation v. Scofield: "Insofar. . .as the so-called 'ultimate fact' is
simply the result reached by processes of legal reasoning from, or the
interpretation of the legal significance of, the evidentiary [or 'subsidi-
ary'] facts, it is 'subject to review free of the restraining impact of the
so-called 'clearly erroneous' rule."88 One court has observed that the
84. See, e.g., Swint, 456 U.S. at 287; Franks, 414 F.2d at 684; United States v.
Richberg, 398 F.2d 523, 529 (5th Cir. 1968). Remand is the usual course for further
fact-finding under the corrected legal test. Swim, 456 U.S. at 291-93. See supra notes
74-76 and accompanying text.
85. See Chaney v. City of Galveston, 368 F.2d 774, 776 (5th Cir. 1966).
86. See, e.g., Lincoln, 697 F.2d at 939-40 (if taints findings); Manning v. M/V
Sea Road, 417 F.2d 603, 607 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc.,
628 F.2d 419, 422 (5th Cir. 1980)("no deference"), vacated on other grounds, 451
U.S. 902 (1981).
87. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1075
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982); Danner v. United States Civil Ser-
vice Comm'n, 635 F.2d 427, 430-31 (5th Cir. 1981); American Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 421 F.2d 442, 451 (5th Cir.)(ultimate issue inherently one of law), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 819 (1970); Bullock v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 266 F.2d 326, 330 (5th
Cir. 1959).
88. 218 F.2d 217, 219 (5th Cir. 1954)(quoting Lehmann v. Acheson, 206 F.2d
592, 594 (3d Cir. 1953)). Broad factual inferences were regarded as "ultimate facts"
and thus treated as a question of law. Inferences were also often involved in the less
stringent review given documentary evidence but were more likely to be analyzed, espe-
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doctrine may be "understood best as an abortive attempt to resolve the
law/fact dilemma by making that elusive distinction less determina-
tive."89 But even within the circuit the effort was criticized. One court
cautioned that while "subjecting inferences or ultimate facts to a
broader review is not novel," the clear error rule "is not to be
discarded."90
The doctrine is "abortive" because "[t]he Supreme Court has lev-
elled it."9' In Pullman-Standard v. Swint, the Court, noting that Rule
52 "does not divide facts into categories,' 92 rejected the former Fifth
Circuit doctrine and its distinction between subsidiary and ultimate
facts. Today the doctrine is no longer viable, though its concepts and
result may continue to affect or survive in related areas.93
cially recently, as falling within the ultimate fact doctrine. See supra note 67.
To say that such inferences are "legal" does not, of course, resolve the conceptual
blending. Compare Bullock, 266 F.2d at 330 (appears to distinguish inference from
ultimate fact), with American Nat'l Bank, 421 F.2d at 451 (no distinction offered).
One discussion of the nature of an inference may prove lasting:
Insofar as any weighing of inferences from given facts is permissible, the
task of the court is not to weigh these against each other but rather to cull
the universe of possible inferences from the facts established by weighing
each against the abstract standard of reasonableness, casting aside those
which do not meet it and focusing solely on those which do. If a frog be
found in the party punch bowl, the presence of a mischievous guest-but
not the occurrence of spontaneous generation-may reasonably be
inferred.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Delta Communications Corp., 590 F.2d 100,
102 (5th Cir. 1979).
89. Byram v. United States, 705 F.2d 1418, 1423 (5th Cir. 1983)(footnote omit-
ted)(tracing the doctrine from Galena Oaks through Swint). It may also be noted that
over the years the doctrine has often been invoked in discrimination cases. See Lincoln,
697 F.2d at 940.
90. United States v. Makris, 535 F.2d 899, 907 (5th Cir. 1976)(citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977).
91. Byram, 705 F.2d at 1422.
92. 456 U.S. at 287. Swint held that the trial court's finding of no discriminatory
intent in a section 703(h) case was a fact reversible only if clearly erroneous. See gen-
erally Calleros, Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate
Treatment Cases, 58 TUL. L. REV. 403 (1983).
93. See supra note 88. It is not clear after Swint, for example, whether some
inferences will be distinguished from ultimate fact and treated as issues of law. The
debate may, for now, be subsumed under the "mixed question" issue, especially since
some cases characterized inferences as mixed questions. But a recent Fifth Circuit
opinion, citing Swint, found "neither the facts found by the district court nor the infer-
ences drawn by it to be clearly erroneous." Cormier v. P.P.G. Industries, Inc., 702 F.2d
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e. Mixed Law-Fact Findings
The Swint Court reserved the question whether its ruling affected
"mixed" questions of law and fact "of the kind that in some cases may
allow an appellate court to review the facts to see if these facts satisfy
some legal concept of discriminatory intent."'9 4 It may be argued, of
course, that a trial court has committed legal error if its findings do not
satisfy a legal standard. In the Eleventh Circuit, review of mixed ques-
tions generally is broad, "allowing us to substitute our own judgment
for that of the lower court."95 Mixed questions of fact and law are not,
as a general matter, reviewable under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard."9' Some courts have held, however, that while Rule 52 is nor-
mally not applicable to mixed questions, it would be applied in the pre-
567, 568 (5th Cir. 1983). Where the disputed finding is a purely legal conclusion
drawn from the facts, however, the issue is one of law and is freely reviewed, even
under Swint. See infra note 96.
94. 456 U.S. at 289. The Court added:
We need not, therefore, address the much-mooted issue of the appli-
cability of the Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and
fact-i.e., questions in which the historical facts are admitted or estab-
lished, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts
satisfy the statutory standard, or to put it another way, whether the rule of
law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. There is sub-
stantial authority in the circuits on both sides of this question.
Id. at 289 n.19. See Gypsum, 333 U.S. at 396. See also infra text accompanying note
125.
It is not always so easy to distinguish between mixed questions and ultimate facts,
and many cases applied them interchangeably. See Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d
1346, 1352 n.4 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982). See also Swint, 456
U.S. at 286 n.16. Swint limited its notion of "ultimate fact" to those decisive to a trial
issue, unmixed with law. The definitions Swint provides may help subsequent courts
make the distinction, however, and it is likely that the cases equating them will not be
used. But even the' courts recognizing a line may find drawing it to be a troublesome
task. See Junior v. Texaco, Inc., 688 F.2d 377, 279 (5th Cir. 1982)("Serbonian bog").
95. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 394 n.7 (5th Cir. 1981)(citing Baker v. Met-
calfe, 633 F.2d 1198, 1201 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 974 (1981)), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 1011 (1982). See Shawgo v. Spradlin, 701 F.2d 470, 482 n.13 (5th Cir.
1983)("greater mixed law-fact scope of review"); Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596, 597
(5th Cir. 1972)("court erred as a matter of law in ruling that the undisputed facts
failed to constitute ineffective assistance").
96. Washington, 655 F.2d at 1352-53. Accord Barrientos v. United States, 668
F.2d 838 (5th Cir. 1981). See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2589, at
753 (1971). But see Funding Systems Leasing Corp. v. Pugh, 530 F.2d 91 (5th Cir.
1976)(clear error test applies to some mixed questions); Pennsylvania Cas. Co. v. Mc-
Coy, 167 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1948).
1985]
23
Childress: Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
sent case since fact questions predominated. 7
f. Law, Fact, or Mixed?
Whether the substantive issue in a particular case is termed a
question of fact, law, or a mixture of fact and law is often a difficult
but linchpin issue under Rule 52(a). That initial determination seems
to be in the hands of the appellate court, since it will often ignore the
characterization used by the trial court. 8 At times, however, the circuit
has expressed its willingness to consider the trial court's classification
of its findings as one factor-though not a determinative one-to use in
the appellate court's initial characterization task.99 The Supreme Court
in Swint recognized the "vexing nature of the distinction[s]' '100 and
noted that Rule 52 does not draw the line between law and fact. In
some areas, however, the circuit has fixed the line, and often in the
process has joined or created a conflict among the circuits.' 0' In others,
reference to comparable situations-or the compelling facts of the case
at hand-may offer guidance for future decisions.
i. Trademarks and Patents
In trademark law, the issue of likelihood of confusion is a question
of fact, subject to Rule 52(a).' °2 Likewise, the classification of a trade-
mark term (as generic, descriptive, etc.) is a fact. 03 A recent court
held that a district court's finding of no profits in the area of trademark
infringement was not clearly erroneous.' Patent validity is a question
of law, as is the test of obviousness, but the factual underpinnings of
97. See Connally v. Transcon Lines, 583 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1978); Backar v.
Western States Producing Co., 547 F.2d 876, 884 (5th Cir. 1977).
98. See, e.g., Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665, 671 (1944); East v.
Romine, 518 F.2d 332, 338-39 (5th Cir. 1975); Ruby v. American Airlines, Inc., 329
F.2d 11, 23 (2d Cir. 1964) (Friendly, J., dissenting), vacated sub nom. O'Connell v.
Manning, 381 U.S. 277 (1965).
99. E.g., Lewis v. S.S. Baune, 534 F.2d 1115, 1119 (5th Cir. 1976).
100. 456 U.S. at 288. See supra notes 77-80, 89 and accompanying text.
101. The "fixed" lines may, of course, be adjusted as Swint makes its impact,
though many tests cited below were decided or reaffirmed after Swint.
102. Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. 615 F.2d 252, 258 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). It is characterized as law, fact, and mixed in other cir-
cuits. See id. at 257-58.
103. Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc., 596 F.2d 111, 113 (5th Cir. 1979).
104. St. Charles Mfg. Co. v. Mercer, 719 F.2d 380 (11 th Cir. 1983).
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such findings are entitled to clear error review.105 Although infringe-
ment and equivalence are facts, construction of a patent is a legal is-
sue.'06 Few patent appeals remain for the regular circuits, 107 but the
doctrine may be useful for illustration and related application.
ii. Contracts and Business Situations
A recent case applied Rule 52 to a finding regarding what the
contracting parties did not intend. 08 Contract interpretation, on the
other hand, is a question of law, 109 as is the preliminary question of
whether an ambiguity exists."' Treated as fact questions are agency
status,"' bailment relationship," 2 and breach of warranty. 1 3
105. See Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 78 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978).
106. See Continental Oil Co. v. Cole, 634 F.2d 188, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
454 U.S. 830 (1981). Cases such as Cole hold, however, that equivalence-normally a
fact-is a legal issue, or perhaps a mixed question, where patent construction is in-
volved. See Weidman Metal Masters Co. v. Glass Master Corp., 623 F.2d 1024, 1030
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 982 (1981).
107. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng'g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1141 (5th
Cir. 1982). Appeal would now be had to the recently created Federal Circuit in the
District of Columbia.
108. See Paragon Resources, Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Dist. Corp., 695 F.2d 991
(5th Cir. 1983). See also infra text accompanying note 115. Another recent case, how-
ever, noted: "The determination of the parties' intentions, as revealed solely by the
contract, is but another form of contract interpretation, and therefore constitutes a
question of law. Only when the contract is ambiguous does determination of the par-
ties' intent involve a question of fact." City of Austin v. Decker Coal Co., 701 F.2d
420, 426 n.18 (5th Cir. 1983)(citation omitted).
Whether a contract was formed, it may be argued, is a legal conclusion based on
factual findings, including the parties' intent.
109. Strachan Shipping Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 701 F.2d 483, 486 (5th Cir.
1983)("clearly erroneous standard does not apply"); City of Austin, 701 F.2d at 425.
110. City of Austin, 701 F.2d at 425-26. See also Freeman v. Continental Gin
Co., 381 F.2d 459, 465 (5th Cir. 1967)(summary judgment context).
111. Strachan, 701 F.2d at 487. But the existence of a fiduciary duty has been
termed, in a summary judgment setting, a legal question. See Lewis v. Knutson, 699
F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983). Similarly, the materiality question in federal fraud cases is a
mixed fact-law inquiry, as found in the summary judgment context, TSC Industries,
Inc. v., Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 450 (1976), though the Ninth Circuit still ap-
plies Rule 52 on review.
112. T.N.T. Marine Servs. v. Weaver Shipyards & Dry Docks, Inc., 702 F.2d
585 (5th Cir. 1983).
113. Martin v. Xarin Real Estate, Inc., 703 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
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iii. Discrimination and Intent Cases
Swint made clear that in that case discriminatory purpose under
Title VII is a pure question of fact. l a4 Indeed, "[t]reating issues of in-
tent as factual matters for the trier of fact is commonplace." ' 1 5 The
Court noted that it has treated as fact purposeful school segregation,
gift motive (and ultimately whether a gift was made) under the tax
code, and intent in antitrust." 6 Additionally, a finding of "no retalia-
tion" is likewise a "final fact.""17 In the Eleventh Circuit, even a find-
ing that the plaintiff has not made out his primafacie case of discrimi-
nation is reviewed only for clear error."'
The doctrine of constructive discharge, used in discrimination and
labor cases, poses a more difficult inquiry. Pre-Swint Title VII cases
treated the issue inconsistently. One court "appl[ied] the facts as found
by the district court to the law of constructive discharge" in holding
that "[a]s a matter of law the facts involved here do not constitute
constructive discharge."" a9 Another case, however, applied the clear er-
ror rule.'20
Since Swint, the Fifth Circuit has noted the standard-of-review in-
consistency and discussed the applicability of Rule 52. It may be ar-
gued, of course, that constructive discharge fits into the Supreme
Court's reserved definition of "mixed" questions. In Junior v. Texaco,
Inc., the new Fifth Circuit found it unncessary in that case to resolve
the issue and expressly reserved the inquiry.' 2' It is now probable, how-
114. 456 U.S. at 286-89. See also Fowler v. Blue Bell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1007, 1012
(11th Cir. 1984); Hill v. K-Mart Corp., 699 F.2d 776 (5th Cir. 1983).
115. 456 U.S. at 288.
116. See id. Following these observations, the new Fifth Circuit has ruled that
the holding purpose of a taxpayer is a fact, and the issue is not less so simply because
the taxpayer's state of mind is not controlling. Byram, 705 F.2d at 1418.
117. McMillan v. Rust College, Inc., 710 F.2d 1112, 1116 (5th Cir. 1983).
118. Jones v. Lumberjack Meats, Inc., 680 F.2d 98, 101 (11 th Cir. 1982), criti-
cized in Calleros, supra note 92, at 437.
119. Bourque v. Powell Elec. Mfg. Co., 617 F.2d 61, 64 (5th Cir. 1980). Framed
in this way, the inquiry sounds much like the definition of mixed questions the Swint
Court used to distinguish ultimate fact. See supra notes 92-93. See also Calcote v.
Texas Educ. Found., 578 F.2d 95, 97, 98 (5th Cir. 1978)("conclusion of law").
120. See Meyer v. Brown & Root Const. Co., 661 F.2d 369, 372 (5th Cir. 1981).
Although categorization of the issue has varied, the substantive legal definition of "con-
structive discharge" in the Eleventh Circuit is consistently stated. E.g., Bourque, 617
F.2d at 65.
121. 688 F.2d 377, 379-80 (5th Cir. 1982). The new Fifth Circuit concluded that
the finding of no discharge was neither legal error nor clear error. Accord Shawgo, 701
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ever, that constructive discharge is either a fact or fact-law.
iv. Tort and Admiralty
Findings of negligence vel non have been categorized as fact ques-
tions in cases involving admiralty'22 and federal 2 3 law. Likewise, the
court's apportionment of fault is subject to the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. 1 24 Causation, even including the "legal" concept of proximate
cause, is treated as fact. 24.1
v. Employee Status
The final conclusion that one is an "employee" (or "employer")
under the Fair Labor Standards Act (F.L.S.A.) is a legal determina-
tion. One court's statement of this characterization may shed light on
the newer definitions of "mixed" questions and reveal how the circuit
will generally analyze ultimate "legal" determinations under Swint:
We review the district court's determination as being one of
mixed law and fact. As to the trial court's underlying factual find-
ings and factual inferences deduced therefrom, we are bound by
the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. However, as to the legal conclusion reached by
the district court based upon this factual data, i.e., here that these
welders are employees rather than independent contractors, we
may review this as an issue of law. 125
F.2d at 470.
122. E.g., Verrett v. McDonough Marine Service, 705 F.2d 1437 (5th Cir.
1983)(negligence and contributory negligence); Inland Oil & Trans. Co. v. Ark-White
Towing Co., 696 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1983).
123. See Brooks v. United States, 695 F.2d 984 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. SEC v.
Geon Indus., Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 53 (2d Cir. 1976). See also J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377
U.S. 426, 431 (1964)(causation is a question of fact to be decided at trial (§ 14(a)
securities case)); McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19 (1954).
124. Harbor Tug and Barge v. Belcher Towing, 733 F.2d 823 (11th Cir. 1984).
Cf. Verrett, 705 F.2d at 1443 (citing Reyes v. Vantage S.S. Co., 672 F.2d 556 (5th
Cir. 1982)).
124.1 Proximate cause in admiralty law is generally treated as fact, Consolidated
Grain & Barge Co. v. Marcona Conveyor Corp., 716 F.2d 1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1983);
Cheek v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 697 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1983), as is seaman status
under the Jones Act, at least in the summary judgment context. See Holland v. Allied
Structural Steel Co., 539 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1105 (1977).
125. Robicheaux v. Radcliff Material Inc., 697 F.2d 662, 666 (5th Cir. 1983)(ci-
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Judge Higginbotham has expressed his concern with this
approach:
Our efforts to justify appellate review by attempting to sepa-
rate intertwined subsidiary facts and ultimate legal conclusions in-
evitably cast surrealistic shadows. The exercise can, and occasion-
ally does, do little more than serve as a covering cape for the
exercise of the trial court function by an appellate court.1 2
Although the F.L.S.A. "employee" or "employer" determinations
are often held to be ultimately a legal issue (following an analysis mix-
ing law and fact), some cases rule to the contrary, holding the statutory
"employer" issue to be one of fact, and, therefore, subject to Rule
52.21 7 A more recent panel, however, has noted the circuit's inconsis-
tent treatment and determined that the most precise labeling makes the
"employer" conclusion legal while basing it on underlying findings of
fact, such as indicia of control.128 This court follows "the substantial
line of authority" in terming it ultimately a legal question.129 It may be
argued, however, that the apparently smaller line of precedent (holding
the question to be fact) is more consistent with the spirit of Swint.
tation omitted). Accord Donovan v. New Floridian Hotel, Inc., 676 F.2d 468, 471
(11th Cir. 1982). See Castillo v. Givens, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S.
-, 104 S. Ct. 160 (1983).
126. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 199 (Higgenbotham, J., concurring). It may be ar-
gued, however, that most legal issues are shaded by case facts, leaving the appellate
court with little reviewing authority if legal conclusions are practically finalized at trial.
Moreover, the analysis of "mixed" questions offered by the Castillo majority seems at
least compatible with the Supreme Court's definition of a mixed question as one in
which "the issue is whether the [established historical] facts satisfy the statutory stan-
dard." Swint, 456 U.S. at 289 n.19.
127. E.g., Hodgson v. Griffin & Brand, 471 F.2d 235, 238 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 819 (1973); Wirtz v. Lone Star Steel Co., 405 F.2d 668, 669-70 (5th
Cir. 1968).
128. Castillo, 704 F.2d at 187 n.12. This panel writes that the confusion
originated from the Supreme Court's characterization of the issue as "essentially a
question of fact" in another context, but reconciles that language with Castillo's mixed
fact-law analysis. See supra text accompanying note 125.
129. Id. It may be noted, however, that while Castillo cites several cases charac-
terizing the employer issue as one of law excluded from Rule 52 and discusses three
contrary cases, in Castillo itself the issue does not arise in ,the Rule 52 context. See
infra note 163.
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vi. Adequate Criminal Representation: Habeas
The adequacy of representation issue over the years has not been
consistently classified in habeas appeals to the former Fifth Circuit, the
cases finding the question to be fact, law, and fact-law. In Washington
v. Watkins, the Fifth Circuit discussed the various interpretations and
concluded that the issue is a mixed question, allowing the appeals court
an independent determination of the final legal conclusion of effective-
ness.130 The specific finding that a lawyer's choice was or was not stra-
tegic, on the other hand, is a fact to be accepted unless clearly errone-
ous.131 The substantive test of constitutional adequacy of counsel has
also consistently been in controversy. 132
130. 655 F.2d 1346, 1351-54 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
Accord Strickland v. Washington, - U.S. _ 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984); Armstead v.
Maggio, 720 F.2d 894, 896 (5th Cir. 1983). Watkins discusses generally the various
characterizations given to other findings in the habeas setting, including constitutional-
ity of identification procedures and sufficienty of the evidence. See 655 F.2d at 1353
n.9. Cf. Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981)(presumption of correctness for state
court written findings of fact).
Also in the criminal context, some cases apply a clearly erroneous rule to fact
findings in criminal hearings. E.g., United States v. Medel, 592 F.2d 1305, 1317 (5th
Cir. 1979)(whether writing is "statement" under Jencks Act); United States v. Wat-
son, 591 F.2d 1058, 1061 (5th Cir. 1979)(voluntariness of confession). These cases are
not clear as to how this standard found its way into the criminal law. E.g., United
States v. Vasilios, 598 F.2d 387, 392 (5th Cir. 1979)(credibility calls at suppression
hearing subject to "normal" clear error standard). Cf. United States v. Hayes, 589
F.2d 811, 822-23 (5th Cir.)(citing both "clearly arbitrary" and "clear error" tests for
competence), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 847 (1979).
131. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1257 n. 24 (5th Cir. 1982)(en
banc)(Unit B), rev'd on other grounds, - U.S. ., 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984). The
reasonableness of that strategic choice, as based on certain assumptions, is also a fact
question. Id. at 1256 n.23. See also Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d at 135 ("basic"
or "historical" facts underlying conclusion of effectiveness are subject to Rule 52).
132. Within the Eleventh Circuit, the issue of effectiveness-and such subissues
as the duty to investigate and the prejudice determination-have more than once war-
ranted en banc consideration. See generally Comment, A Coherent Approach to Inef-
fective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 71 CALIM L. REv. 1516 (1983).
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B. Findings in a Jury Trial
1. The Verdict
a. Requirement of Evidentiary Basis: General Review Principles
Although the Founding Fathers granted the Supreme Court "ap-
pellate jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact," '133 that power was
checked by the seventh amendment: "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than accord-
ing to the rules of the common law. 134 Jury facts are, in reality, re-
examined. A jury verdict cannot stand without an evidentiary basis.
Whether that basis is adequate to support the verdict has historically
been determined by a "substantial evidence" measure.135 In the Elev-
enth Circuit, the requirement of substantial evidence is in turn tested
by a "reasonable conflict" or "reasonable juror" standard.13 6
The issue usually is presented on an appeal as review of the dis-
trict judge's decision on a motion for judgment n.o.v., or of the grant-
ing of a directed verdict where the issue is not submitted to the jury. 3 7
In the directed verdict situation, review is judged as well by the test of
reasonableness, in this case framed in terms of a requirement that a
fact issue be submitted if reasonable men could differ on the conclu-
133. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The courts of appeal are given similar authority.
See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (1982).
134. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Juries were seen as the citizen's protection from
an autocractic and centralized chancery court. See Clark & Stone, Review of Findings
of Fact, 4 U. CHi. L. REV. 190, 192 (1937).
135. See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)(jury fact-
finding to be accepted unless no substantial evidence supports); Comfort Trane Air
Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th Cir. 1979).
A "substantial evidence" standard is also used to review most jury verdicts in
criminal cases. United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir.)(en banc),
cert. denied, 440 U.S. 962 (1979). See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 488-91 (1951)(fact-findings in formal administrative actions). This is defined, in
both contexts, by a test of reasonableness. E.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305
U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See also supra note 44 and accompanyiny text.
136. E.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Pruitt, 385 F.2d 841, 850 (5th Cir.
1967)(judge erred in not directing verdict or granting j.n.o.v.), cert. denied, 391 U.S.
913 (1968). The court appears to frame the reasonableness test as an application of the
substantial evidence requirement, and no suggestion is made that two different tests are
actually involved.
137. See infra note 180 and accompanying text. Thus the same standard used to
review the verdict is applied to certain decisions by the trial judge concerning the rea-
sonableness of the verdict or a potential verdict, despite the procedural techniques used.
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sions to be reached from the evidence presented. 138 A frequently-quoted
passage from Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Falgoust"'3 sum-
marizes the court's general approach to a verdict:
We have said that if there were no evidentiary basis for the
jury's verdict, it cannot be permitted to stand, and that the stan-
dard for reviewing a jury verdict is whether the state of the proof is
such that reasonable and impartial minds could reach the conclu-
sion the jury expressed in its verdict. The jury is, of course, the
traditional finder of facts, and its verdict must stand unless appel-
lant can show that there is no substantial evidence to support it,
considering the evidence in the light most favorable to appellees,
and clothing it with all reasonable inferences to be deduced
therefrom. 140
The verdict is affirmed "where there is reasonable basis in the record"
such that the "conclusion could, with reason, be reached on the
evidence."' 41
b. Boeing: Rejection of "Scintilla" Rule
A verdict requires an evidentiary basis. But is the converse true?
Must the verdict stand if there is some basis, and how much evidence is
"substantial"? A conflict developed within the circuit over whether, in
applying the substantial evidence test, the reviewing court is to accept a
verdict if some evidence supports it. The conflict is alternatively framed
by the question whether the appellate court looks to one side of the
facts only. On this question the circuits have disagreed, and the Su-
preme Court has not said "yes" or "no" recently on the issue. But in
1969 the en bane Fifth Circuit, in Boeing Company v. Shipman,142 re-
jected the "complete absence of probative facts" standard formerly ap-
plied to general civil appeals.143 The court articulated the proper test:
138. See, e.g., Helene Curtis, 385 F.2d at 850.
139. 386 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1967)(affirming judge's denial of a directed verdict,
j.n.o.v., and new trial).
140. Id. at 253 (citations omitted).
141. Id. Some cases add that the test means whether reasonable jurors could,
under any theory submitted to them, have resolved the dispute as they did.
142. 411 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1969)(en banc). The decision affirmed the trial
court's denial of directed verdict and j.n.o.v.
143. Id. at 370-73. Planters Mfg. Co. v. Protection Mut. Ins. Co., 480 F.2d 869,
874 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 930 (1967), specifically overruled by Boeing, had
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[T]he Court should consider all of the evidence-not just that
evidence which supports the non-mover's case-but in the light and
with all reasonable inferences most favorable to the party opposed
to the motion. If the facts and inferences point so strongly and
overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the court believes that
reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict, granting of
the motions [for d.v. or j.n.o.v.] is proper. On the other hand, if
there is substantial evidence opposed to the motions, that is, evi-
dence of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded
men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
conclusions, the motions should be denied, and the case submitted
to the jury. A mere scintilla of evidence is insufficient to present a
question for the jury.144
The court summed up, "[t]here must be a conflict in substantial evi-
dence to create a jury question."' 45
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence on the entire record,
the trial court considers the record intact and must take the record as
presented to the jury.146 The court may not grant a directed verdict of
j.n.o.v. by ignoring admitted evidence and then gauging the jury's per-
formance under the fiction that the erroneous evidence was not before
it, or by entering judgment on a record altered by the elimination of
incompetent evidence. 147
c. The F.E.L.A. and Jones Act Cases
Although the Boeing standard of considering all evidence applies
held that the Supreme Court's F.E.L.A. standard applied generally. See infra note 148.
See also Helene Curtis, 385 F.2d at 850-51 (weighing all the evidence is a "trap").
144. Boeing, 411 F.2d at 374 (footnote omitted). This means that the appeal
"should not be decided by which side has the better of the case" or by the "complete
absence" standard. Id. at 374-75.
The Boeing sufficiency test, though federal and arguably substantive, is to be ap-
plied in diversity cases. Id. at 368 (noting split in circuits).
145. Id. at 375. Constitutional and institutional arguments in favor of the re-
jected "some evidence" test may be found in Planters and Judge Rives' dissent in
Boeing.
146. Midcontinent Broadcast Co. v. North Central Air, Inc., 471 F.2d 357, 358
(8th Cir. 1973), cited in Sumitomo Bank of California v. Product Promotions, 717 F.2d
215, 218 (5th Cir. 1983).
147. See Sumitomo Bank, 717 F.2d at 218. This methodology may, however, be
acceptable when applied to a new trial motion. See id. (citing Montgomery Ward &
Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940)). See also infra note 343 and accompanying text.
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to most claims, the old "complete-absence" rule is still used to review
Federal Employees Liability Act 48 and Jones Act'49 verdicts. Less evi-
dence is necessary to support a finding in such cases, it is explained,
since a less demanding proof-of-causation standard, requiring only
"slight negligence," is applied.150 Findings on an unseaworthiness
claim, on the other hand, are reviewed under the Boeing standard.1 5'
In Jones Act cases, the stricter review standard imported from
F.E.L.A. cases is usually applied where the defendant employer has
asked for a directed verdict. 52 It is uncertain, however, whether the
underlying policies equally support the strict test where the seaman has
moved for a directed verdict, and the "reasonable man" litmus may
provide the appropriate standard for reviewing evidence sufficiency in
the latter case. 53 The court has noted this reciprocity problem but nor-
mally has found it unnecessary to resolve this conflict and policy
dilemma.15 4
d. Applications Since Boeing. Inferences and Credibility
Many cases cite both Boeing and Liberty Mutual in setting forth
the proper test. Apparently Boeing does not supersede the guiding lan-
guage in Liberty Mutual, so long as the latter's general rules are read
in light of the appellate discretion allowed in Boeing.55 It is clear in
148. Lavender v. Kurn, 327 F.2d 645 (1946). See Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336
U.S. 53, 57 (1949); Allen v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 623 F.2d 355, 359-60 (5th Cir.
1980); Boeing, 411 F.2d at 370.
149. Allen, 623 F.2d at 359-60. See Ferguson v. Moore-McCormick Lines, Inc.,
352 U.S. 521, 523 (1957); Gaspard v. Taylor Diving & Salvage Co., 649 F.2d 372 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907 (1982).
150. See Comeaux v. T.L. James & Co., 702 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1983)(on
rehearing).
151. Id. at 1025-26 (noting the difficulty of mixing Jones Act and unseaworthi-
ness claims). See Allen, 623 F.2d at 359-60.
152. See Allen, 623 F.2d at 360. But see Campbell v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 581
F.2d 98, 99 (5th Cir. 1978).
153. See, e.g., Robin v. Wilson Bros. Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
But the court has consistently used the F.E.L.A. test when reviewing the evidence sup-
porting a finding of the seaman's contributory negligence. See id. at 98 n.2.
154. See, e.g., id. at 98 & n.2; Allen, 623 F.2d at 360.
155. Cases also cite similar general language in Blount Brothers Corp. v. Reli-
ance Ins. Co., 370 F.2d 733 (5th Cir.)(trial court erred in directing verdict), cert. de-
nied, 387 U.S. 907 (1967), though that case allowed no appellate reweighing of the
entire record. See id. at 739.
For application of the sufficiency test in combination with burden of proof and
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application, however, that the Boeing rule is firmly accepted in the cir-
cuit. 156 In applying the Boeing standard, some courts have indicated
that the type of evidence pointing to the questioned conclusion may be
considered in determining whether the evidence is "substantial." "Un-
supported, self-serving testimony is not substantial evidence sufficient
to create a jury question."' 57
This application must be read in light of Boeing's caution that "it
is the function of the jury as the traditional finder of the facts, and not
the Court, to weigh conflicting evidence and inferences, and determine
the credibility of witnesses. '158 The jury's authority has been inter-
preted to mean that inferences and ultimate facts are for the jury, sub-
ject to reversal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the resulting
findings . 59 Nevertheless, "[i]t is, of course, axiomatic that inferences
...cannot stand in the face of uncontradicted and substantial evi-
dence to the contrary."'1 0
e. Law and Fact
In the sufficiency situation, as in a bench trial, facts are submitted
to the fact-finder, but law is freely reviewed. 16 Inferences a jury draws
are reviewed within the standard sufficiency test and not judged under
a separate set of review rules. More basically, the law between "law"
persuasion issues, see Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas, 393 F.2d 371, 380 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 961 (1968). For example, the party with the burden of persua-
sion may have to show "overwhelming" evidence to overturn a verdict against her. See
Allen, 623 F.2d 355, 360 n.9 (5th Cir. 1980). Nevertheless, this standard may be said
to be an application of, rather than an exception to, the usual Boeing test.
156. See e.g., McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 758 (5th Cir.
1979)(some evidence of manual's defect not enough to preclude a directed verdict). See
also Jefcoat v. Singer Housing Co., 619 F.2d 539, 543 (5th Cir. 1980)(reversing grant
of j.n.o.v.).
157. Comfort Trane Air Conditioning v. Trane Co., 592 F.2d 1373, 1383 (5th
Cir. 1979)(citation omitted). But "[a] verdict based on irrelevant evidence cannot
stand." Crossland v. Canteen Corp., 711 F.2d 714, 728 (5th Cir. 1983).
158. Boeing, 411 F.2d at 375. Accord Liberty Mutual, 386 F.2d at 253.
159. See Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1124 & n.6 (5th Cir.
1978)(discussed in summary judgment context, citing Boeing and Liberty Mutual).
160. Scott Medical Supply Co. v. Bedsole Surgical Supplies, Inc., 488 F.2d 934,
937 (5th Cir. 1974)(citation omitted). See also Comfort Trane, 592 F.2d at 1382-83.
These cases do not suggest that they are in conflict with the leeway Boeing gives to the
jury to judge credibility and inferences.
161. See supra note 77. See generally supra notes 77-132 and accompanying
text. See also infra notes 286-305 and accompanying text (summary judgment).
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and "fact" is of a different character than that found in the Rule 52(a)
context. When a judge's finding is reviewed, initial characterization of
the finding as one of fact or law is in essence mere shorthand for the
general standards-of-review inquiry: Does the clear error rule apply?
When the proper standard is chosen, the case must still be ana-
lyzed-through the standard-of-review prism-and the evaluative deci-
sion follows.
In the jury situation, on the other hand, "law or fact?" is the deci-
sion and not really a standard-of-review set-up. Procedurally, review
deals with the relation between judge and jury: Did the judge properly
take the issue away from the jury? The answer to this question is sub-
stantive, since the judge has committed legal error if he or she was
wrong in not submitting it.16 2 In determining whether the judge so
erred, the substantive law, rather than general standards-of-review lan-
guage, controls. Thus, unlike in the usual standard-of-review situation,
"law or fact?" is more a substantive inquiry, and no follow-up applica-
tion is necessary. Whether the court legally erred in taking an issue
from the jury is often phrased in evidentiary terms: Does the evidence
establish a certain issue "as a matter of law"? And that question is in
turn answered by reference to the substantive law and the facts of the
case sub judice1 13
162. The judge may, of course, be challenged for wrongly deciding to submit an
issue to a jury, though some courts seem less willing to consider it reversible error. See
Control Components, Inv. v. Valtek, Inc., 609 F.2d 763, 770 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 1022 (1980). See also Continental Conveyors & Equipment Co. v. Prather
Sheet Metal Works, Inc., 709 F.2d 403 (5th Cir. 1983)(although patent construction
normally a legal question, court properly allowed jury to consider claim's meaning in
judging infringement); Tights, Inc. v. Acme-McCrary Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th
Cir.)("if an issue presents a mixed question of fact and law, it may be submitted if the
jury is instructed as to the legal standard to be applied"), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980
(1976). Cf. Baumstimler v. Rankin, 677 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1982) (criticizing the court
for directly submitting validity issue to jury).
163. See Contintental Conveyor, 709 F.2d at 405 (distinquishing Rule 52 review
of a bench trial from submission-to-jury issue); United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co.
v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970)(directed verdict review is "a
pure question of law"). The fact-law dilemma thus may appear in two forms in jury
situations. First, is the issue properly one of fact which the jury should have consid-
ered? Second, are fact-findings incorrect as a matter of law? The inquiry depends on
the substantive law and facts, as framed by the directed verdict or j.n.o.v. context, and
the various law/fact characterizations established in the substantive law are beyond the
scope of a standards-of-review article.
Some cases indicate that the classifications made under Rule 52 may be used in
the parallel inquiry under j.n.o.v. review. E.g., Castillo, 704 F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1983)
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2. Fact Findings and Damages
a. Findings by Jury
The Boeing standard also applies to specific jury findings, such as
those made on written interrogatories under Rule 59.1 One court, for
example, applied both Boeing and Liberty Mutual in upholding jury
findings of fair market value. 165
b. Special Verdicts: Inconsistencies
The court may, under Rule 49(a), submit the case to the jury in
the form of specific fact questions accompanied by appropriate legal
instructions. A fact issue not submitted is, absent request or objection,
considered submitted to the judge.166 The jury's written findings are
protected by constitutional and procedural guidons. Where the findings
are apparently inconsistent, "[t]he Seventh Amendment requires that if
there is a view of the case which makes the jury's answers consistent,
the [trial] court must adopt that view and enter judgment
accordingly. 16 7
(court erred in submitting FLSA employee status to jury since status is a legal question
and was established as a matter of law). Castillo adds the broad and very arguable
statement that the "plaintiff's decision to exercise his right to a jury trial does not
change the standard of review to be applied by this court." Id. at 187 (footnote omit-
ted). In context, however, the court was not applying a standard of review but instead
adopted the Rule 52 standard in deciding the purely legal and substantive issue
presented in that case. See Continental Conveyor, 709 F.2d at 405-06. Judge Higgin-
botham expressed some seventh amendment concern with the Castillo analysis. See
supra text accompanying note 126.
164. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a) governs special verdicts; Rule 49(b) allows the general
verdict with interrogatories.
165. Sammons v. United States, 433 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 945 (1971). See also Liberty Mutual, 386 F.2d at 253.
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 49(a); Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 704
F.2d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir. 1983).
167. Griffin v. Matherne, 471 F.2d 911, 915 (5th Cir. 1973). The test the trial
court uses to reconcile ostensible conflicts "is whether the answers may fairly be said to
represent a logical and probable decision on the relevant issues as submitted." Id.
The Fourth Circuit has found reversible error in a district judge's decision to re-
turn the case to the jury although the first answers given were not legally inconsistent.
See McCollum v. Stahl, 579 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912
(1979).
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c. Damages
Whether evidence supports a jury's assessment of damages-as
well as the figure chosen-should also be reviewed by a test of reasona-
bleness. The upper limit has been defined as the "maximum which the
jury could reasonably find." 16 8 Other guiding phrases abound and ei-
ther coexist with or interpret a reasonableness test. A recent case stated
that the appeals court "will not reverse the jury's verdict unless the
award is so large that it shows passion or prejudice or shocks the judi-
cial conscience." 169 Especially where subjective evaluations are made,
the award must be "grossly excessive. 17 0
A damages award may be challenged as erroneous as a matter of
law (for example, the award was based on faulty legal apportionment
principles, or on damages legally unavailable). 7 1 But the damages
challenge usually arises in the context of reviewing the trial judge's
initial discretionary response to the jury's finding. The cases have not,
however, clearly separated the legal sufficiency question from this new
trial (or conditional new trial) situation.17 2
However the test is framed, it is apparent that the jury's choice in
practice is given real deference. "[E]xamination of the Fifth Circuit
cases in this field reveals only rare instances in which the court felt
168. See Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., 512 F.2d 671, 672 (5th Cir. 1974)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). Accord Bonura v. Sea
Land Serv., 505 F.2d 665, 669 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf. Perricone v. Kansas City Southern
Ry. Co., 704 F.2d 1376, 1382 (5th Cir. 1983)("when approved by the trial judge, such
awards will be overturned only when contrary to right reason or for a clear abuse of
discretion."). See generally Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.
1975).
169. See Pope v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 703 F.2d 197, 207 (5th Cir.
1983).
170. See id. at 206-07 (judge did not abuse discretion since the verdict was not
gross excess). Pope adds that the verdict is taken as is-before trebling-in determin-
ing its excessiveness vel non. Id.
171. See, e.g., id. at 203-04.
172. See generally infra notes 331-40 and accompanying text. The cases do not
clearly separate the various procedural paths in which the damages issue arises (except
perhaps where the court reviews a judge's reduction of the jury award, infra note 323)
or the precedent and catch phrases called on to set up the appellate determination.
Thus, the principles outlined in this section may be found in the new trial context. E.g.,
supra note 170. But they may also inform generally the reasonableness review for ex-
cessiveness. Perhaps the Eleventh Circuit could clarify these distinctions, or at least
settle on an ungarnished reasonableness test, avoiding the proliferation of further defi-
nition and the bleeding of theoretically different review situations.
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bound to set aside a jury award for its exessiveness.'' A point of de-
parture from this general observation may occur when the trial judge
has, within his discretion, reduced an award.7 The appeals court, de-
spite seventh amendment concerns, has given the judge leeway, finding
abuse "only when it appears that the jury's original verdict was clearly
within the universe of possible awards which are supported by the evi-
dence."'17 5 But the jury's award, at any rate, "is not to be disturbed
unless it is entirely disproportionate to the injury sustained. 17 6
3. Directed Verdict and J.N.O.V.
a. Rule 50 and Review Principles
Rule 50 sets forth the procedural rules governing motions for di-
rected verdicts and judgment non obstante veredicto.'7 7 Although the
rule does not on its face require the judge, as does Rule 52, to make
findings, the motion must state its grounds,7 8 and the court must, in
making the conditional decision on new trial included in Rule 50, spec-
ify the decisional reasons. 7 9 The trial court uses the same standard in
passing on a motion for directed verdict or j.n.o.v. as does the appellate
court in reviewing the judge's decision on the motion. 180 This standard
173. Perricone, 630 F.2d at 319 (reversing damages).
174. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
175. Bonura, 505 F.2d at 670 (emphasis in original).
176. Caldarera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778, 784 (5th Cir. 1983).
177. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(d.v.) and 50(b)(j.n.o.v.).
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a). See generally O'Brien v. Westinghouse Elec. Co.,
293 F.2d 1, 5-10 (3d Cir. 1961). This requirement, settling an early conflict in the
cases, may in practice inform the appellate court, even where a judge does not spell out
his or her grounds in an opinion or judgment.
179. FED. R. Civ. P. 50(c).
180. E.g., Sulmeyer v. Coca-Cola Co., 515 F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. de-
nied, 424 U.S. 934 (1976). See Hayes v. Solomon, 597 F.2d 958, 972 (5th Cir. 1979).
The same standard applies whether the motion is for directed verdict or j.n.o.v., and
whether the judge grants or denies the motion. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Weyer-
haeuser Co. v. Bucon Const. Co., 430 F.2d 420, 423 (5th Cir. 1970). It may be argued
that application of the directed verdict test may be slightly different when defendant
brings the motion at the close of all evidence rather than plaintiff's case, since the
moving party once the evidence is in, having the burden of proof, should show that her
opponent's proof is insufficient as a matter of law and that her own evidence suffices
and cannot be discarded by the jury. See generally Grey v. First Nat'l Bank in Dallas,
393 F.2d 371, 380 (5th Cir.)(discussing sufficiency and burden of proof), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 961 (1968).
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is, of course, the general test for sufficiency of a jury's verdict and find-
ings outlined in Boeing Company v. Shipman.181
b. Directed Verdict as Prerequisite
A motion for j.n.o.v. cannot be made unless an earlier proper di-
rected verdict motion was made (and renewed, if necessary). The ear-
lier motion "is a prerequisite, virtually jurisdictional."" 2 Although this
rule is followed strictly, the courts at times will stretch the notion of
what constitutes a motion under the rule.183 Occasionally the trial court
will grant j.n.o.v. even though no directed verdict motion has been
made. In such a situation the Fifth Circuit has recently indicated it will
review the case as where the sufficiency is challenged on appeal after
no j.n.o.v. motion at all had been filed, i.e., asking whether "any" evi-
dence supports, or plain error taints, the jury's finding.18 4 The Eleventh
Circuit, applying former Fifth authority, may follow suit.
c. Review After No Motion: "Plain Error"
Failure to move for directed verdict, or to renew the motion by
moving for j.n.o.v., is said to preclude review of a jury verdict. "It is
well settled that in the absence of a motion . . . made at trial this
Court cannot examine the evidence for sufficiency. 11' 5 Nevertheless,
the language of "plain error" has slipped into the case law.18s Thus,
181. See generally supra notes 142-80 and accompanying text. The trial court
must consider the record as presented to the jury. See supra notes 146-47 and accom-
panying text. See infra notes 324-325 for comparison of these motions with the new
trial on appeal.
182. Perricone v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 704 F.2d 1376, 1380 (5th Cir.
1983). See FED. R. Civ. P. 52(b); Rawls v. Daughters of Charity, 491 F.2d 141 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1032 (1974).
183. See,e.g., Roberts v. Price, 398 F.2d 954 (5th Cir. 1968). See also FED. R.
Civ. P. 46 (general rule that formal exceptions are unnecessary).
184. See Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1380.
185. Delchamps, Inc. v. Borkin, 429 F.2d 417, 418 (5th Cir. 1970). See Dunn v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 639 F.2d 1171, 1175 (5th Cir.), modified on other grounds,
645 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981); Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., Inc. 463 F.2d
12,15 (5th Cir. 1972)("short answer" is that no motion for a directed verdict equals no
review for sufficiency). The cases are sometimes lenient in defining a sufficient motion
under this rule. See Coughlin v. Capitol Cement Co., 571 F.2d 290 (5th Cir.
1978)(considering partial preservation by new trial motion). See also Quinn v. South-
west Wood Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 1018, 1025-26 (5th Cir. 1979).
186. See, e.g., Dunn, 639 F.2d at 1175; Urti v. Transport Comm'l Corp., 479
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although "we may not question the sufficiency of whatever evidence we
do find," the court may reverse if "plain error has been committed
which, if not noticed, would result in a manifest miscarriage of
justice. 18 7
Applications of the plain error exception is an inquiry standing in
contrast to the normal Boeing standard: the court affirms if there is
"any evidence supporting the jury's finding." 188 One court, for example,
reversed on a determination of "no evidence" in reviewing a directed
verdict motion not renewed by j.n.o.v. motion. 8
C. Trial Judge: Supervision and Discretion
1. Evidence and Trial
a. Evidentiary Rulings: "Abuse of Discretion"?
Evidentiary matters are said to be committed to the "discretion"
of the trial court. On appeal in the various circuits this means that
evidentiary calls, in general, are reviewed only for "abuse of discre-
tion." As one recent court observed, sounding almost tired: "Time and
again we have stated that the admission of evidence is within the sound
discretion of the district court. Absent proof of abuse an appellate court
will not disturb a district court's evidentiary rulings. 190
F.2d 766, 769 (5th Cir. 1973). See generally Coughlin, 571 F.2d at 297.
187. Little v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 426 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1970).
188. Id. (emphasis in original). See also Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715
F.2d 983, 986-87 (5th Cir. 1983). The cases are not always clear whether the "any
evidence" rule is the application of a "plain error" exception, or "plain error" is an
alternative ground for relief, even where some evidence exists. But the cases do not
indicate a conflict in interpretation, much less an outcome-determinative one, possibly
because the rule echoes the pre-Boeing "scintilla" test.
189. Gorsalitz v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corp., 429 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 921 (1972).
190. Jon-T Chems., Inc. v. Freeport Chem. Co., 704 F.2d 1412, 1417 (5th Cir.
1983)(citations omitted). See Noel Shows, Inc. v. United States, 721 F.2d 327 (1Ith
Cir. 1983). See also infra note 197 and accompanying text (applicability of evidence
rules in bench trials). Sometimes the test for evidence is phrased as "clear abuse" or
"manifest error." See Perkins v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 596 F.2d 681, 682 (5th
Cir. 1979). One case stated that rulings must be affirmed unless they affect a substan-
tial right of the complaining party, though the language is probably an application of
harmless error doctrine rather than evidentiary scope of review. See Whitehurst v.
Wright, 592 F.2d 834, 840 (5th Cir. 1979); FED. R. EvID. 103(a). See also infra note
197. The cases do not, at any rate, appear in practice to distinguish "abuse" from
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The cases do not go on to define such "abuse" though obviously
substantial deference is involved. As Professor Rosenberg observes, dis-
cretion is a pervasive yet elusive concept.19' The standard is, at any
rate, broadly applied in many evidence situations.1 92 The notion of "dis-
cretion" in reality has two dimensions: the broad manner with which a
judge can deal with the matter below, and the limited review afforded
such decisions.1 93 Many evidentiary rulings involve both sides of this
coin, so that tethered review follows from situations where the trial
judge was in the position to exercise discretion. Many cases set out the
standard-of-review in this format, first noting that the judge has discre-
tion, then adding that review is thus limited.
In the evidentiary context, however, the "abuse" test is often used
even where the judge has not specifically used true discretion. Although
the "abuse of discretion" standard is, on its face, the appropriate test
by which to review a judge's application of an evidence rule to trial
facts, it does not necessarily follow that all evidence rulings should be
given "abuse" deference, especially where the challenged ruling is sim-
ply the legal analysis of the applicability or construction of a given
rule, The latter decisions are, analytically, conclusions of law rather
than exercises of discretion. Nevertheless, many cases state the "abuse"
test as one of general review of evidentiary calls.'94 Conversely, many
"clear abuse," though the latter might be said to apply to those rulings which necessa-
rily involve true discretion at trial. See infra notes 193, 261 and accompanying text.
In criminal cases, too, determinations on admissibility are said to reside generally
within the district court's discretion. E.g., United States v. Cohen, 544 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977); United States v. Linetsky, 533 F.2d 192,
204 (5th Cir. 1976). More generally, the criminal area is usually not presented as
having a separate set of evidence rules. Cf. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973); infra note 199. Administrative law, on the other hand, may in practice follow
its own star. See E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 348, at 997-1000 (3d ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE]. However, in some contexts
the agency must follow the federal fules. E.g., NLRB v. Gulf States United Tel. Co.,
694 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1982)(Board bound "so far as practicable" by regulation).
191. Rosenberg, supra note 13. "What are the standards or factors that lead to a
finding that there has been an abuse of discretion? The decided cases are not especially
informative." Id. at 180.
192. See, e.g., Ramos v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 615 F.2d 334, 340 (5th Cir.
1980); King v. Ford Motor Co., 597 F.2d 436 (5th Cir. 1979); Gaspard v. Diamond M
Drilling Co., 593 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1979); Bailey v. Kawasaki-Kisen, K.K., 455 F.2d
392 (5th Cir. 1972).
193. See Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 175.
194. E.g., Jon-T Chems., 704 F.2d at 1417. This approach may be used because
of the difficulty, in close cases, of determining where discretion ends and legal analysis
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cases do not rely on the "abuse" test or refer to the judge's discretion,
but-apparently following the principle that errors of law are freely
corrected-simply decide whether or not the evidence was admissible;
if not, and prejudice resulted, the reviewing court will reverse.19 5
Applicability of the "abuse" standard is especially clear-and per-
shaps deference is stronger-where the evidentiary ruling is based on a
rule explicitly giving discretion to the court or where an evidentiary call
is intimately bound with the trial facts. A prejudice determination
under Federal Rule of Evidence 403, for example, necessarily involves
true discretion. "This is a question of legal relevance, a matter on
which the trial judge has wide discretion, and which the appellate court
wil not reverse unless the trial judge has clearly abused his discre-
tion." 196 Nevertheless, the courts do not state that the "abuse" stan-
dard should be limited to such situations.
Whether an evidentiary call is challenged as abuse or simple error,
the appellate court must, under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a), fur-
ther inquire whether "a substantial right of the party is affected," since
nonprejudicial, "harmless" erorrs are not reversed.197 On the other
begins, though the cases do not reveal a conscious choice.
195. See, e.g., Central Freight Lines, Inc. v. NLRB, 653 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th
Cir. 1981)("matter of law" that hearsay admitted erroneously); Reyes v. Missouri Pac.
R. Co., 589 F.2d 791, 794-95 (5th Cir. 1979). See generally 10 J. MOORE & J. LUCAS,
supra note 25, §§ 609.13, 609.14. It may be, of course, that no practical difference
results, since erroneously admitted evidence is likely to constitute an abuse. Neverthe-
less, traditionally a lax abuse standard defines how hard the appeals court looks for
error, and in the final analysis, legal error may be more easily excused under review
only for abuse.
196. Wright v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 580 F.2d 809, 810 (5th Cir.
1978). See Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Marcona Conveyor Corp., 716 F.2d
1077, 1082 (5th Cir. 1983). But the discretion is not unbounded; further, a distinction
may be made for the appellate court in deciding whether Rule 403 is legally applicable
or the legal requirements of any such application. See United States v. Beechum, 582
F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978)(en banc)(Rule 404(b)), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920 (1979);
Bailey, 455 F.2d at 392 (Rule 407).
197. FED. R. EvID. 103(a) provides that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a
ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is af-
fected" and the error is properly preserved. Any such harmless error must be distin-
guished from the same-named analysis used to review constitutional error. See gener-
ally R. TRAYNOR, THE RIDDLE OF HARMLESS ERROR (1970). Cf. Haddad v. Lockheed
Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1457-59 (9th Cir. 1983)(distinction drawn on criminal/civil
lines more appropriate than "constitutional"/"nonconstitutional" dichotomy); infra
notes 367-68 and accompanying text.
Although the evidence rules apply to trial by jury or judge, their application may
[Vol. 9
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hand, alleged errors not properly preserved by timely objection or offer
of proor 198 may be tested for "plain error" under Rule 103(d). 99
A safe summary, then, concludes that "abuse of discretion" is the
general standard to be applied on review of most evidentiary decisions,
except perhaps those evidence rules which do not appear to commit to
the trial court's discretion. 0° Next, reference to a case which applies
the test to the specific rule in question would be helpful, as would the
facts sub judice which might establish such abuse.201 Finally, the re-
viewing court must examine an otherwise reversible decision for
"prejudice to a substantial right of the party contesting the admission,
coupled with timely objection. 20 2
Although the cases do not clearly distinguish between evidence
rulings which are generally affirmed absent abuse and those situations
be relaxed somewhat in a bench trial. This view is said to have its strongest impact
where appellate courts review for prejudice. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra
note 190, § 60, at 153-54. See also C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 96, at 645 (4th ed.
1983); Builders Steel Co. v. Commissioner, 179 F.2d 377, 379 (8th Cir. 1950).
198. FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(1)(specific objection requirement to party attacking
admission) and 103(a)(2)(offer of proof where exclusion is challenged). Cf. FED. R.
Civ. P. 32(d)(3).
199. FED. R. EvID. 103(d) provides: "Nothing in this rule precludes taking notice
of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the atten-
tion of the court." See United States v. Garcia, 530 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1976). The
Advisory Committee's Notes observe that in practice plain error is more likely to arise
where evidence is admitted than excluded.
Since Rule 103(d) neither proscribes nor prescribes "plain error" review, resort to
the case law is necessary to establish such a rule in the circuit. Although the exception
is often applied in criminal cases, such as United States v. Abravaya, 616 F.2d 250,
251-52 (5th Cir. 1980), and is patterned after FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(d), it is less clear
how-and how much-the rule will be applied in civil actions. MCCORMICK ON EVI-
DENCE states that the plain error rule is "much less common in civil cases than in
criminal cases, perhaps in part because liberty and life are not involved as a motive to
apply the doctrine.. . ." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 190, § 52, at 134
(footnote omitted), though the Notes of the Advisory Committee are to the contrary.
See generally Wangerin, "Plain Error" and "Fundamental Fairness," 29 DE PAUL L.
REV. 753 (1980).
200. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(language of "shall") and 803(24) (discretionary
federal hearsay exception, implying that other exceptions are not discretionary).
201. The appellate lawyer might, of course, wish to argue (and find cases to sup-
port) that a certain evidentiary call is in effect a question of law, for example, how
"regular practice" in the business records rule, FED. R. EVID. 803(6), should be inter-
preted. See United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 705, 210 (5th Cir. 1983).
202. Rubin, The Admiralty Case on Appeal in the Fifth Circuit, 43 LA. L. REV.
869, 873 (1983)(footnotes omitted).
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where it is more appropriate, at least tacitly, to review admissibility vel
non as a matter of law, it might be argued that a distinction should be
drawn where the ruling "is based on facts or circumstances that are
critical to decision and that the record imperfectly conveys."20 3 The
line might be called true discretion. The circuit may, of course, find the
line undesirable and prefer an "either/or" course where, as presently, it
appears that an unspoken line is drawn from intuition or appellate
facts. Nevertheless, "[t]o tame the concept [of discretion] requires no
less than to force ourselves to say why it is accorded or withheld, and to
say so in a manner that provides assurance for today's case and some
guidance for tomorrow's."20 4
b. Comment on the Evidence
Despite the traditional concept of the judge as a passive umpire,
the modern trial judge has maintained the common-law power of sum-
mary and assessment of the evidence. This authority is, of course, sub-
ject to the limitations forced by the jury's function and the requirement
of impartiality. 0 5 Judge's comments which have the effect of prevent-
ing the jury from resolving an issue of fact are error unless the court
could have directed a verdict on that issue.206
c. Supervision of Trial
Most of the district court's decisions by which the trial is super-
vised and conducted, including timing, control, and oversight of argu-
ments, are said to be within the court's discretion.20 7 Affirmance is
203. Rosenberg, supra note 13, at 183 (emphasis omitted).
204. Id. at 185 (emphasis in original).
205. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470 (1933). The judge may
not, for example, state which view of conflicting evidence is more credible. Many states
do not permit the practice of commenting on the evidence. See C. WRIGHT, supra note
197, § 94, at 629. See also id. § 97, at 651.
206. McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 760-62 (5th Cir. 1979);
International Paper Co. v. United States, 227 F.2d 201, 205 (5th Cir. 1955). See gen-
erally I J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 107[07] (1981). For
review of such comment after faulty objection, see Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical
Co., Inc., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1972).
207. See generally Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)("broad su-
pervisory discretion"). For review of jury argument which was not objected to, see
Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 512 F.2d 276, 286 (5th Cir. 1975). Of course the
circuit may impose requirements on how the discretion is exercised, as by requiring on-
[Vol. 9300
44
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss2/1
1985] Eleventh Circuit Standards of Review 301
mandate absent abuse. The standard is broadly applied, for example, to
sequestration of witnesses, 0 ' qualifying experts, 0 9 application of the
pretrial order,21 0 and even the use of offensive collateral estoppel. 11
Also discretionary are dispositions on motions for mistrial212 and inter-
vention, 13 as well as voir dire matters. 1 4 Because of the realities of the
trial situation, the judge's supervisory power is often, in practice, inevi-
tably broad. As one appellate judge has observed:
The trial judge is a potent figure indeed. . . . He can commu-
nicate his attitude in a thousand ways from a cocked eyebrow to a
sideways glance. Those will not be of record. They are not review-
able. Trial judges are disciplined ultimately only by their good
faith and integrity and by an occasional reminder from their appel-
late brethren to be constantly vigilant of their power.2 15
the-record determinations or other factors the trial court "must" consider.
208. McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs. Co., Inc., 700 F.2d 260,
262 (5th Cir. 1983).
209. Ludlow Corp. v. Textile Rubber & Chem. Co., 636 F.2d 1057 (5th Cir.
1981).
210. Emmons v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 701 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1983)(cit-
ing Calamia v. Spivey, 632 F.2d 1235 (5th Cir. 1980)). The Emmons court noted that
if "the parties actually litigate without objection issues not raised in the order, there is
little reason to enforce pretrial elimination of the issues." Id. at 1118 (quoting Perfec-
tion-Cobey Co. v. City Tank Corp., 597 F.2d 419, 420 (4th Cir. 1979)). See also Flan-
nery v. Carroll, 676 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1982). But introduction of evidence on an issue
already in the case does not necessarily show consent to trying a new issue. See Inter-
national Harvester Credit Corp. v. East Coast Truck, 547 F.2d 888, 890 (5th Cir.
1977). In something of a twist of analysis, Emmons states that it is not abuse to admit
evidence not in the pretrial order where the opposing party does not object. 701 F.2d at
1118-19.
211. Brumley Estate v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 704 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1288 (1984). The doctrine's condi-
tions are set out in Rufenacht v. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc., 656 F.2d 198, 202 (5th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
212. See Nevels v. Ford Motor Co., 439 F.2d 251, 258 (5th Cir. 1971)(mistrial
on basis of improper argument).
213. See Lelsz v. Kavanagh, 710 F.2d 1040, 1043 (5th Cir. 1983)(denial under
Rule 24(a)(2) reversed as abuse).
214. Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120, 1128 (5th Cir. 1983)("wide
discretion").
215. Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1378-79. Professor Wright once noted that the "fed-
eral judge is a very puissant figure," and adds that "it is wise to leave many details of
procedure to the informed discretion of the judge." C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97,
at 651-52. See also infra text accompanying note 315.
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Nevertheless, the court does not hesitate to reverse if the requisite
abuse is found.216
d. General Supervision and Discretion
District judges are more than just trial judges; their function in-
volves supervision of litigation in the broader sense and other duties of
control and direction over the docket, the district, and parties before
the court. The broad rule of district judges, like the judgments of im-
mediate trial control, are often considered discretionary.
i. Supervisory Applications
The Eleventh Circuit has applied the "abuse of discretion" test to
a wide assortment of supervisory situations, including transfer of an
action2 17 and determination of "excusable neglect" for untimely appel-
late filings. 218 The test is also applied to the court's decision on class
certification, 21 9 as well as its approval of a proposed class settlement220
or consent decree.22' The severence of trials under Rule 42(b) is re-
216. See United States v. Welliver, 601 F.2d 203, 208 n.12 (5th Cir. 1979).
217. See Abshire v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832 .(5th Cir. 1982).
When the successor court reconsiders an order or judgment picked up from the trans-
fer, its decision is within its discretion though, for reasons of comity, the court ought
not overrule the prior judge. Id. See also Gallimore v. Mo. Pac. RR, 635 F.2d 1165
(5th Cir. 1981).
218. See Gann v. Smith, 443 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1971)(broad discretion to apply
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)). See also Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat Packers, Inc.,
371 U.S. 215 (1962)(great deference). Cf. Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir.
1983)(excusable neglect for incomplete discovery).
219. See Ezell v. Mobile Housing Bd., 709 F.2d 1376 (1lth Cir. 1983). See also
Everitt v. City of Marshall, 703 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1983)(denial of certification not an
abuse); Sheffield v. County Bd. of Supervisors, 439 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1971)(motion to
dismiss class action). See generally Note, Federal Appellate Review of the Grant or
Denial of Class Action Status, 18 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 101 (1976)
(appealability).
220. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982 (11th Cir. 1984). See Reed v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 703 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1983). Reed surveys the cases and lists the
factors for reviewing the exercise of discretion in this area. See also In re Corrugated
Container Antitrust Litig., 643 F.2d 195 (5th Cir. 1981).
221. See Williams v. City of New Orleans, 694 F.2d 987 (5th Cir. 1982)(finding
abuse in denial of approval), rev'd en banc, 729 F.2d 1554 (5th Cir. 1983); United
States v. City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc). The panel opinion in
Williams also notes that the fact-findings on which the judge's decision is based are
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viewed for abuse,122 as is the consolidation of actions223 and continu-
ances.2 24 Often in a particular area the judge is given discretion, sub-
ject to review for abuse, but the cases tack on some additional cautions.
Rule 41(b), for example, empowers the court to dismiss an action invol-
untarily for failure to prosecute or comply. The discretion, however, is
to be exercised only in extreme cases.225 Likewise, although the court
has broad discretion in controlling discovery,2 6 it must "adhere to the
liberal spirit of the Rules, 227 and "[t]he imposition of unnecessary
limitations on discovery is especially frowned upon in Title VII
cases."
228
accepted unless clearly erroneous.
222. United States v. 499.472 Acres of Land, 701 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1983)(not-
ing relevant factors). Professor Wright analyzes the problems and factors where issues
are submitted to separate juries. C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97, at 651-52. The
Fifth Circuit recently expressed similar concern over a bifurcation decision:
While we do not doubt the power of a trial court to order a separate
trial on its own motion or, in its discretion, to separately try the damage
issues in a case such as this, the present record nevertheless illustrates the
unfortunate confusion which can occur when the above-quoted admonition
...is not fully heeded.
Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th Cir. 1983)(citing Response of Caro-
lina, Inc. v. Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976)).
223. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §§ 2382-2386 (1971). FED.
R. Civ. P. 42(a) permits the judge to order joint trial of separate actions. In both
situations discretion is limited too by the requirement that the actions involve a com-
mon issue of law or fact. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 97, at 652-53. Professor
Wright also discusses the factors and tests for a judge's joinder of parties (noting fed-
eral discretion), acceptance of voluntary dismissal (broad common law power restricted
somewhat by Rule 41(a)), referral to a master (rule discretionary but requires certain
circumstances, especially in nonjury cases), and disqualification (must be and seem im-
partial). See id. at 651-55.
224. Capaci v. Katz & Besthoff, Inc., 711 F.2d 647, 665 (5th Cir. 1983).
225. See Mann v. Merrill Lynch, 488 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1973). But involuntary
dismissal for inadequate proof is reviewed on legal grounds. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 306-10.
226. Scroggins v. Air Cargo, Inc., 534 F.2d 1124, 1133 (5th Cir. 1976).
227. Burns v. Thiokol Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 300, 304 (5th Cir. 1973). The
Federal Rules in general "are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment." Hickman
v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). See generally Note, Appellate Review of Discov-
ery Orders in the Federal Courts, 1980 S. ILL. U.L.J. 339 (appealability).
228. Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 406-07 (5th Cir. 1983)(finding
abuse).
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ii. Attorneys' Fees and Costs
Much like the review of discovery orders, an award of attorney's
fees is within the judge's discretion,22 but should be awarded in civil
rights cases "unless special circumstances would render such an award
unjust. ' 230 Similar rules govern costs under Rule 54(d). 23' "[W]hile an
award of costs to a prevailing party is usual, the inclusion of various
items within that award is within the discretion of the trial judge. 232
iii. Forum Non Conveniens and Choice of Law
Choice of law determinations are not reviewed under the abuse
test, 33 but are subject to de novo appellate review.23 4 Conversely, the
appeals court "may reverse a district court's decision on a motion to
229. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. Manges, 702 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1983)(award af-
firmed unless abuse). The abuse standard has been applied in diversity cases, and statu-
tory cases, such as 20 U.S.C. § 3205 and 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The factors relevant to a
determination are articulated in Johnson v. Ga. Hwy. Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th
Cir. 1974). But cf. Northcross v. Bd. of Educ. of Memphis City Schools, 611 F.2d 624
(6th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 911 (1980); Louisville Black Police Officers
Org., Inc., 700 F.2d 268, 273 (6th Cir. 1983). It is not yet clear whether Johnson
applies to diversity cases. See Atlantic Richfield, 702 F.2d at 87.
230. Brown v. Miller, 631 F.2d 413, 414 (5th Cir. 1980)(citing § 1988). See 28
U.S.C. § 204(a) (1982). See also Blum v. Stenson, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 1706
(1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
Some statutes, such as the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(4)(E)(1982 & Supp.), are more neutral grants of discretion, requiring no spe-
cial presumption of an award. See Blue v. Bureau of Prisons, 570 F.2d 529 (5th Cir.
1978)(listing relevant factors). It appears that diversity cases are similarly neutral on
the attorneys' fee issue, depending of course on state law. See Atlantic Richfield, 702
F.2d at 87.
231. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(d). See 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4)(1982)("may award").
232. Hodge v. Seiler, 558 F.2d 284, 287 (5th Cir. 1977). See Newman v. A.E.
Staley Mfg. Co., 648 F.2d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1981)(reversing "vacation of costs will
require an abuse of discretion"); In re Nissan Antitrust Litig., 577 F.2d 910, 918 (5th
Cir. 1978)("clear abuse"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1072 (1979). While cost matters are
subject to review for abuse, a finding on necessity is considered factual. See
Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 713 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1983).
233. Bailey v. Dolphin Int'l, Inc., 697 F.2d 1268, 1274 (5th Cir. 1983). See also
Phillips v. Amoco Trinidad Oil Co., 632 F.2d 82, 84 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 920 (1981). Cf Loumar, Inc. v. Smith, 698 F.2d 759 (5th Cir. 1983)(facts under-
lying finding of no minimum contacts in personal jurisdiction inquiry not clearly
erroneous).
234. Bailey, 697 F.2d at 1274. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235,
257 (1981); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
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dismiss based on forum non conveniens only if its action constitutes a
clear abuse of discretion."2 5
iv. Injunctions and Declaratory Actions
The trial court usually has broad discretion in granting or denying
a preliminary injunction, subject to review for abuse. 3 6 (Stays pending
appeal are subject to a similiar analysis.)2 37 Because the application for
relief is in equity, fact findings by which the judge supports his decision
are subject to Rule 52(a) . 38 Although the abuse standard is generally
employed among the circuits, the Second Circuit has developed a line
of broad de novo review when the judge's decision rests on documen-
tary evidence. 39
The equity court, even when fashioning more permanent relief, is
generally acting in a discretionary capacity, subject of course to the
235. Constructora Spilimerg, S.A. v. Mitsubishi Aircraft Co., 700 F.2d 225, 226
(5th Cir. 1983).
236. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600
F.2d 1184, 1187 (5th Cir. 1979). The abuse standard has long been applied in such
situations. See United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435, 437-38 (1936). See generally
Deckert v. Independence Corp., 311 U.S. 282, 290 (1940)(orders issued under court's
general equitable powers reviewed only for abuse).
The courts, both trial and appellate, consider four factors: likelihood of success on
the merits, irreparable injury, no substantial harm to other parties, and the public in-
terest. E.g., State of Tex. v. Seatrain Int'l, 518 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1975). Findings on
these four factors are mixed fact-law questions. Buchanan v. United States Postal
Serv., 508 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975). See also Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. F.P.C.,
259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958)(establishing the now-popular four-part formula).
Cf. Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1435 (9th Cir. 1983)(the Ninth Circuit organizes
these factors into a "continuum" analysis).
The district court is required to make findings of fact and law. Canal Auth. v.
Callaway, 489 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1974).
237. See Lopez, 713 F.2d at 1435. Although the judge's decision is said to be
reviewable only for abuse, courts will grant a stay of an injunction pending appeal only
sparingly and regard it as "an extraordinary form of reprieve." Reed v. Rhodes, 472 F.
Supp. 604, 605 (N.D. Ohio 1979). The stay is a disfavored remedy because it inter-
rupts the ordinary process of judicial review and postpones relief for the prevailing
party who has been found entitled to an equitable remedy. United States v. State of
Tex., 523 F. Supp. 703, 729 (E.D. Tex. 1981).
238. See American Rice, Inc. v. Ark. Rice Growers Co-op Ass'n, 701 F.2d 408,
411 n.2 (5th Cir. 1983). Cf. supra note 236 (four factors as mixed questions).
239. See State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 550 F.2d 745, 750-
52 n.6 (2d Cir. 1977).
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peculiar requirements of equity jurisdiction.24 The Supreme Court has
stated that "the scope of a district court's equitable power to remedy
past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equita-
ble remedies."241 The "abuse" deference is often given, for example, to
the judge's remedy in desegregation cases.242 The district court appar-
ently has similar authority when applying its equitable remedy. In re-
viewing a trial judge's decision that one party had not violated his in-
junction, the courts have stated: "We see no basis for substituting our
judgment for that of the district judge in interpreting his own order.1"243
The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act permits the district court
to declare the rights of the parties before it.244 In the Eleventh Circuit,
the decision to take a case under the Act is discretionary to the court,
though it may not decline by whim.245 Other circuits permit broader
review, citing the liberal purpose of the statute as circumscribing the
trial court's discretion. 246 Declaratory jurisdiction may, at any rate, be
240. These requirements, including inadequacy of legal remedy, property inter-
est, and lack of equitable defenses, seem subject to legal definition by the reviewing
court, though the district judge, in weighing the facts and fashioning a remedy, is exer-
cising discretion. Cf. Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, -U.S.-, 104 S.
Ct. 2576, 2585 n.8 (1984) (implying review more circumscribed for preliminary injunc-
tions than with permanent relief).
241. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971). See
also Keyes v. Denver School Dist., 396 U.S. 1215, 1216 (1969)(Brennan, J., in cham-
bers). While the appeals court is "free to re-assess the district court's conclusions of
law, its findings of fact must be accepted unless clearly erroneous." Ross v. Houston
Indep. School Dist., 699 F.2d 218, 226 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Baylor v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 733 F.2d 1527 (11th Cir. 1984).
242. See Valley v. Rapides Parish School Bd., 702 F.2d 1221, 1225 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 276 (1984).
243. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Abel Eng'g Indus., Inc., 693 F.2d 1140, 1146 (5th
Cir. 1982)(quoting Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Sloan, 535 F.2d 679, 681 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977)).
In criminal contempt cases, review of the sentencing decision is by the abuse test.
United States v. Leyva, 513 F.2d 774, 779 (5th Cir. 1975).
244. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1982).
245. Hollis v. Itawamba County Loans, 657 F.2d 746, 750 (1981). Accord Dug-
gins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1963). A distinction should be made, of course,
between the decision to decide and the decision on the merits of the action.
Similarly, general abstention decisions are also subject to abuse review. See
Midkoff v. Tom, 702 F.2d 788, 789 n.1, 799 (9th Cir. 1983). But once jurisdiction is
found proper, the court normally should not abstain absent exceptional circumstances.
Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1046 (11 th Cir.
1982).
246. E.g., Alsager v. District Court of Polk County, 518 F.2d 1160 (8th Cir.
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inappropriate where the issues are speculative or one party is attempt-
ing a game of "procedural fencing." '247
v. Pendent Jurisdiction
The exercise of pendent jurisdiction over state law claims com-
bines both mandatory (jurisdictional minimum) and discretionary (ap-
propriateness of keeping state claims) elements.248 Even when the dis-
trict judge is acting within her "discretion," however, she ordinarily
"should" dismiss pendent state claims if the federal claims are dis-
missed before trial.249
vi. Leave to Amend
Permission to amend pleadings under Rule 15 presents a subtle
quirk in the judge's usual discretion. Where a party is not entitled to
amendment as of right, he may apply to the court for leave, "and leave
shall be freely given when justice so requires."250 But the court's deci-
sion-either granting or denying leave-is committed to its discre-
251 b25onltion, ' reversible only where abuse is found. 52 Factors justifying de-
nial include prejudice to the opponent, undue delay and dilatory
motive, bad faith, repeated failure to cure deficiencies, and the futility
of amendment.253 Denial is also more likely affirmed if denial is made
after summary judgment, although not necessarily affirmed if other re-
1975); Beacon Const. Co. v. Matco Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1973). See FED-
ERAL PROCEDURE § 23:37 (Lawyers Ed. 1982).
247. Hollis, 657 F.2d at 750 (discussing factors). See FEDERAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 246, § 23:9.
248. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966). See generally
Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejec-
tion of the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 1399 (1983).
249. E.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726; Kavit v. A.L. Stamm & Co., 491 F.2d 1176,
1179-80 (2d Cir. 1974).
250. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(a).
251. E.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 330
(1971). This discretion is said to be similar to that for supplemental pleadings. See
Lewis v. Knutson, 699 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1983). Rule 15(d), governing the latter,
makes no particular requirement of liberal amendment.
252. Gregory v. Mitchell, 634 F.2d 199, 203 (5th Cir. 1981).
253. Zenith Radio, 401 U.S. at 331; Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).
The court, in fact, requires the trial judge to consider prejudice. See Zenith Radio, 401
U.S. at 331.
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lief motions have been granted.2 54 Normally, however, leave should be
granted, for although review is limited to determining whether the trial
court's decision is an abuse of discretion, the policy of liberal amend-
ment directs that "unless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to
amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to per-
mit denial."2 55 The quirk is that liberal amendment clashes with court
discretion, at least when the judge denies amendment.2 56 While the
"abuse" test is said to apply in either case, in practice "the" test is
applied differently. Where amendment is allowed, affirmance is routine;
a denial also is often affirmed, but the appellate court nearly always
applies and analyzes the relevant factors itself in determining whether
denial was abuse. Some courts, then, find the factors wanting and re-
verse the district court.25
Moreover, it is likely that the judge's discretion will be checked
more in future cases. Application of the abuse standard was developed
under case law which gave no preclusive effect to the judge's discretion-
ary call. The new Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, has recently ruled,
however, that res judicata principles may be applied to claims for
which amendment was denied.258 While the direct impact of this deci-
sion remains to be felt, reviewing courts may be much more reluctant
to affirm, as a matter of course, the judge's discretion where the denied
amendment, in theory freely given, extinguishes a claim forever. 59
vii. "Discretion": A Final Note
The tension inherent in the leave to amend cases-where discre-
254. See, e.g., Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Inv. Corp., 660 F.2d 594, 598 & n.2 (5th
Cir. 1981); Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459, 469 (5th Cir. 1967).
255. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598. Denial is also affirmed where no legal basis ex-
ists for the amended claim or defense.
256. An early court cautioned that amendment is not a mechanical absolute, im-
plying that it is nonetheless rarely denied-a liberal policy which may be said to con-
flict with narrow "abuse" review. Freeman, 381 F.2d at 468. The standard, though
consistently cited today, is not necessarily uniformly applied or implied between circuit
panels. Compare Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 598-99, with Daves v. Payless Cashways, Inc.,
661 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981).
257. E.g., Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 599. Other courts, though affirming, at least
probe the "discretionary" decision. See, e.g., Union Planters, 687 F.2d at 121; Daves v.
Payless Cashways, Inc., 661 F.2d 1022, 1024 (5th Cir. 1981).
258. Nilsen v. City of Moss Point, 701 F.2d 556 (5th Cir. 1983)(en banc).
259. See McKee v. McDonnell Douglas Technical Servs., Inc., 705 F.2d 776
(5th Cir. 1983)(denial of rehearing en banc).
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tion is the standard but review is often probing, employing established
guidelines-also reveals itself in other discretionary situations, includ-
ing discovery and involuntary dismissal. The court gives a theoretically
free hand to the district judge but immediately creates impediments
and establishes qualifications for exercising the discretion. On appeal
the result is often something of a hybrid "abuse" test where abuse is
more commonly found and less pejoratively implied. 60 It must be
asked, then, whether the circuit in fact employs at least two "abuse of
discretion" standards. Though "the" test is the same, there seems to be
a real distinction, in common sense and review standard, between a
judge's approval of amendment-blessed by Rule 15(a)-and the de-
nial of leave. The court appears to have responded, at least implicitly,
to a perceived difference in these twins and other situations.
Of course, the addition of factors to be considered in exercising
discretion is not necessarily freer review, and the courts often frame the
factors not as the rationale for broader review of abuse but as elements
pointing to an abuse where incorrectly considered. In some situations,
however, the appeals court may be doing more, resulting in a freer ap-
pellate hand. If the court makes a tacit distinction between two or more
"abuse" standards, the dividing line might be seen as "true" discretion,
where real trial authority translates into effectively restricted review. 26a
Such a line might underlie the oft-quoted but unexplained juxtaposition
of review for "abuse" and review for "clear abuse"2 2 (if there is a
difference), though the court does not appear to be consciously pursu-
ing a distinction. In application, for example, the courts do not indicate
that abuse is present but not clear.
In the final analysis, however, the concept of discretion quite natu-
rally fights uniformity, so it should not be surprising that review of
260. The courts state, however, that a finding of abuse of discretion is not a
pejorative label upon the trial judge. E.g., Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting
Corp., 694 F.2d 998 (5th Cir. 1982). Nevertheless, an ironic consequence of the way
review standards are often phrased is the number of jurors who are labeled "unreasona-
ble" and the relative frequency with which district judges, whose power is solemnly
granted, are said to have "abused" it.
261. See supra notes 180-83. See generally Rosenberg, supra note 189. Professor
Rosenberg discerns at least four levels of discretion in action. See also Chris-Craft
Indus., Inc., v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 389 (2d Cir.)(in comparing "the"
abuse test for grants versus denials of SEC injunction, judge notes "scope of review
would appear to be different," but urges abuse to be found "whatever abuse of discre-
tion standard be applied"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 910 (1973).
262. See supra note 189.
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discretion is not always consistently applied or even theorized. Never-
theless, the circuit has broadly set out one abuse of discretion inquiry
as the standard for reviewing district courts' trial and supervisory roles.
2. Jury Instructions
a. Form and Content
The form of jury instruction and the method of objection are con-
sidered procedural points. The federal courts look to federal law in
framing instructions at trial and in reviewing charge form on appeal.2 6
Where state law defines the contested right or action, however, state
law of course governs the substance of the charge.26 4 The actual con-
tent of jury instructions presents, then, a question of substantive law
rather than standard of review, and legal errors are freely reversed if
prejudicial. In reviewing the manner of instruction, the federal courts
are not always picky about language and format. As long as the jury is
not misled, prejudiced, or confused, "[a] party is not entitled to have
the jury instructed in the particular language of its choice."26 5 The re-
viewing court considers "the charge as a whole, viewing it in light of
the allegations of the complaint, the evidence, and the arguments of
counsel. 2 66 These principles have also been applied where the appel-
lant complained of the timing of portions of the charge.2 67 Similarly,
the court's choice to submit the case in the form of a special verdict is
said to be within its discretion.268
263. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1096 (1974). One reflection of the differing federal approach is the power to com-
ment on the evidence. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
264. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2555, at 651-52
(1971).
265. Baker & Co., Fla. v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 569 F.2d 1347, 1350
(5th Cir. 1978).
266. Smith v. Borg-Warner Corp., 626 F.2d 384, 396 (5th Cir. 1980). "If,
viewed in that light, the jury instructions are comprehensive, balanced, fundamentally
accurate, and not likely to confuse or mislead the jury, the charge will be deemed
adequate." Scheib v. Williams-McWilliams Co., 628 F.2d 509, 511 (5th Cir. 1980).
267. See Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Engineering Industries, Inc., 693 F.2d 1140,
1142 n. 1 (5th Cir. 1982). See generally supra note 166 for review of supplemental
instructions.
268. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 94, at 630-31. See also supra note 165.
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b. The Test: Technical Errors and the Jury's Function
The circuit has indicated that review of jury instructions is not a
search for utopia or an exercise in technicalities. As one court summa-
rized the standard:
A technical imperfection does not occasion reversal when it is part
of a charge that otherwise adequately instructs the jury on the ap-
plicable law. We must determine 'not whether the charge was
faultless in every particular but whether the jury was misled in any
way and whether it had understanding of the issues and its duty to
determine those issues.' If the charge as a whole 'leaves us with
substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been prop-
erly guided in its deliberations' it cannot stand. 6 9
In sum, then, "[i]nstructions are considered adequate if the jury is
given an appropriate understanding of the controlling law and of its
role in the decision-making process .... ,,27o Even where language and
form is placed in the hands of the trial judge, the Eleventh Circuit will
reverse where the charge fails these principles. 271
c. "Plain Error"?
Rule 51 provides: "No party may assign as error the giving or the
failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury
retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds of his objectio." 172 Since no "plain error" ex-
ception is supplied, as is specifically the case in criminal cases under
269. McCullough v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 587 F.2d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 1979)(ci-
tations omitted). See also McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 573-74 (5th Cir. 1971).
McCullough, quoting Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076,
1100 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974), states one aspect of the test as
requiring that the jury not be misled in any way. Id. at 759. Other courts ask whether
the charge is likely to mislead. See Scheib, 628 F.2d at 511. The possible variation in
the language, however, is not presented as inconsistent in theory or application. See
also Johnson v. Bryant, 671 F.2d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir. 1982)("ineradicable doubt").
270. Farmhand, 693 F.2d at 1142.
271. See, e.g., Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1387-88 (11th Cir. 1982).
See also Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1374-75 (5th Cir. 1983)(instructions
insufficient, misleading, and confusing); McCullough, 587 F.2d at 759 (contradictory
charge and summation constituted erroneous directed verdict).
272. FED. R. Civ. P. 51.
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the federal rules,273 the civil rule literally means no review. Some cir-
cuits, including the Ninth, openly apply Rule 51 strictly. 74 Some old
Fifth Circuit panels appeared to find themselves precluded from review
without suggesting a plain error exception.2 75 Many former Fifth Cir-
cuit cases, however, have indicated such an exception. Most of these
offer the exception in dicta, finding that if there were error it would not
be "plain. 276 Other courts, especially recently, have found that plain
error was present and reversed accordingly. 77 The circuit also appears
willing to consider an objection adequate under a lenient objection rule,
at least where it brings the trial court's attention to the defect.2 78
Moreover, requested instructions are not necessary to preserve error in
failing to instruct on the controlling issues or in giving erroneous or
misleading instructions.279
3. Motions for Judgment or Relief
a. Rule 12(b)(6) Dismissal
A district court considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is told that "a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should not be granted
273. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
274. See Bock v. United States, 375 F.2d 479 (9th Cir. 1967). The Third Cir-
cuit, on the other hand, has increasingly reversed for plain error.
275. E.g., Landry v. Two R. Drilling Co., 511 F.2d 138, 141 (5th Cir. 1975).
Such cases simply fail to mention a possible exception to the no-review rule.
276. See, e.g., Hoover, Inc. v. McCullough Indus., 380 F.2d 798, 801 (5th Cir.
1967)(no error found; exception by comparison to prejudicial argument cases); Pruett
v. Marshall, 283 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1960). See DeJoris v. United States, 409 F.2d
2 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 830 (1969). Cf. Rivers v. Angf. A/B Tirfing, 450
F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1971)(charge not fundamentally erroneous).
277. See, e.g., Jamison Co., Inc. v. Westvaco Corp., 526 F.2d 922, 932-33, reh'g
denied, 530 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1976); Industrial Dev. Bd. v. Fuqua Industries, Inc., 523
F.2d 1226, 1237-40 (5th Cir. 1975). Most of these cases also call the error "fundamen-
tal" or a "miscarriage." See also cases cited in Rodrigue v. Dixilyn Corp., 620 F.2d
537, 540-41 (5th Cir. 1980)(setting out the standard).
278. See Pryor v. Gulf Oil Corp., 704 F.2d 1364, 1375-76 (5th Cir. 1983). See
also note 251. But see Hall v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., 715 F.2d 983, 988-89 (5th Cir.
1983).
279. See 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 2556 (1971)("[tlhe court
must instruct the jury properly on the controlling issues of the case even though there
has been no request for an instruction or the instruction requested is defective."). See
generally Pryor, 704 F.2d at 1375-76. Cf. Herman v. Hess Oil, 524 F.2d 767, 771 (3d
Cir. 1975)(invited error).
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unless it appears to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be allowed
to recover under any state of facts which could be proved in support of
his claim."2 80 The appellate court reviews under the same standard.281
The federal courts generally read the plaintiff's allegations liberally:
"The form of the complaint is not significant if it alleges facts upon
which relief can be granted, even if it fails to categorize correctly the
legal theory giving rise to the claim. '28 2 The liberalization of complaint
construction and procedures has led Professor Miller to note the decline
of Rule 12(b)(6), remarking that it was last used "during the McKin-
ley Administration. 283
Rule 12(b)(6) applies where one party challenges the legal claim
presented in a pleading; after pleadings are closed either party may
move for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). In either case,
where matters outside the pleadings are considered, the court must use
the standard and procedures for summary judgment under Rule 56,284
though as a practical matter the legal inquiry may be similar since
facts are not material if they carry no legal import.285
b. Summary Judgment
i. "Material Fact": Test and Burdens
Summary judgment is appropriate if the full record discloses "that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 286 On review the
280. Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829, 831 (5th Cir. 1976). See generally Conley v.
Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, § 1357,
at 598 (1969)(motion disfavored and rarely granted).
281. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S.
519 (1974); Fontana v. Barham, 708 F.2d 221, 227 (5th Cir. 1983).
282. Dussouy, 660 F.2d at 604. Cf. Daves, 661 F.2d 1022 (5th Cir. 1981); FED.
R. Civ. P. 9(b). The court in evaluating the motion takes the factual allegations as true
and in the light most favorable to plaintiffs. E.g., Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 235-37. An even
less stringent pleading standard is applied to pro se complaints, for example in § 1983
actions. See Watts v. Graves, 720 F.2d 1416, 1419 (5th Cir. 1983).
283. Quoted in Carter, Panel "Inquires"-Is Bok Wrong?, Harv. L. Record,
Dec. 9, 1983, at 2.
284. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(c). See generally infra note 286.
285. See infra note 289. Generally, however, the Rule 12(b)(6) focus in on law
while Rule 56 is on "material" facts; moreover, different procedures and materials are
used. For the requirement of written findings and conclusions, see infra note 296.
286. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Everything in the record, including depositions and
affidavits, is considered, unlike in the pre-trial dismissal situation. See also Underwood
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appellate court applies the same test as the district courts.287
The court may not weigh the evidence or its probative value, nor
may the court resolve any factual issues discerned in the record,2 s8 but
a factual dispute without legal significance is not "material."2 9 Mate-
rial facts are those which may affect the outcome of litigation.' 0 The
moving party carries the burden, an "exacting" one, of demostrating
absence of fact and entitlement to judgment, so that the evidence, and
all inferences therefrom, must be viewed in the light most favorable to
the opponent and all reasonable doubts resolved in his favor.2"' Thus,
even where all facts are known or stipulated, summary judgment may
nonetheless be inappropriate:
v. Hunter, 604 F.2d 367, 369 (5th Cir. 1979)(judge may sua sponte convert motion to
dismiss into summary judgment motion but must then comply strictly with Rule 56).
The plaintiff or the defendant may move for summary judgment as to all or part
of a claim or defense. The motion may be granted in equity. Even where the mecha-
nism is appropriate, the court may in its discretion deny the motion. C. WRIGHT, supra
note 197, § 99, at 663-65, 667, 669. See generally Bruce v. Travelers Ins. Co., 266
F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1959); Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Criti-
cal Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974).
In diversity cases, the federal Rule 56 standard still controls. Nunez v. Superior
Oil Co., 472 F.2d 1119, 1123 n.5 (5th Cir. 1978). But the legal issues underlying the
action are of course creatures of state law.
287. See, e.g., Thrasher v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Ins. Co., 734 F.2d 637
(11 th Cir. 1984); United States Steel Corp. v. Darby, 516 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1975).
288. E.g., Miles v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 703 F.2d 193, 195
(5th Cir. 1983). Cf. Robin v. Wilson Brothers Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir.
1983)(court in new trial situation may weigh evidence). Nor may the court consider
inadmissible evidence. Freeman v. Continental Gin Co., 381 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1967).
289. See Union Planters Nat'l Leasing Co. v. Woods, 687 F.2d 117, 119 (5th
Cir. 1982)("contested fact must have some legal significance to be material to the reso-
lution of a case"). Thus the court has stated, in language similar to the test for Rule
12(b)(6) motions, that summary judgment normally is granted "only when the moving
party has established his right to judgment with such clarity that the nonmoving party
cannot recover ...under any discernible circumstance." Everhart v. Drake Mgmt.,
Inc., 627 F.2d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 1980). See infra note 292.
290. See Kennett-Murray Corp. v. Bone, 622 F.2d 887, 892 (5th Cir. 1980).
291. E.g., Thrasher, 734 F.2d at 639; Impossible Elec. Techniques, Inc. v.
Wackenhut Protective Sys., 669 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1982); Joplin v. Bias, 631
F.2d 1235, 1237 (5th Cir. 1980); Stafford v. United States, 611 F.2d 990 (5th Cir.
1979). See also United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654 (1962). The motion is
denied where "reasonable minds might differ on the inferences arising from undisputed
facts," Impossible Elec., 669 F.2d at 1031. Cf. O'Brien v. Eli Lilly & Co., 668 F.2d
704 (3d Cir. 198 1)(Higginbotham, J., dissenting).
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There is no litmus that infallibly distinguishes those issues that are
"factual" from those that are "legal" or "mixed." When all those
material facts susceptible of objective determination are known,
there may be inferences or conclusions to be drawn from them.
Many observations that may appear superficially to be factual are
the result of inference, viewpoint, and judgment. At ends of the
spectrum, it may be relatively easy to separate fact and law, but as
we approach the point where facts and the application of legal rule
to them blend, appraising evidentiary facts in terms of their legal
consequences and "applying" law to fact become inseparable
processes. In some instances where facts may assume infinitive va-
riety, legal rules are deliberately stated in a fashion calling for the
application of judgment.2 2
Although the moving party maintains the burden under Rule 56,
when a motion is made and properly supported,
an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials
of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise pro-
vided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 293
The non-moving party, then, "is required to bring forward 'significant
provative evidence' demonstrating the existence of a triable issue of
fact. ' 294 Additionally, the nonmover cannot present one view of the
purported factual dispute (or legal theory of its materiality) to the trial
292. Nunez v. Superior Oil Co., 572 F.2d 1119, 1123 (5th Cir. 1978). Nunez
cites jury sufficiency cases, including Boeing and Liberty Mutual, in reversing sum-
mary judgment, and notes that inferences and ultimate facts are for the jury, subject to
reversal if the evidence is insufficient to sustain the resultant findings. Nunez, 572 F.2d
at 1124 & n.6. In theory, however, the summary judgment inquiry is different from the
j.n.o.v. situation since inferences under Rule 56 are not really left to the jury but are
decided, against the movant, in determining the propriety of summary judgment. See
First Nat'l Bank of Ariz. v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289-90 (1968)(summary
judgment vehicle typically appropriate where only issue is the legal significance to be
ascribed to undisputed record facts).
Rule 56(c) also provides for procedural protections different from those under
Rule 12, including ten day notice before hearing. See infra note 296.
293. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Thus, "[diefense of a proper summary judgment mo-
tion requires more than a mere denial." Union Planters, 687 F.2d at 119.
294. Ferguson v. Nat'l Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d 111, 114 (5th Cir. 1978). See
also Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Bar Co., 526 F.2d 389, 396 (5th Cir. 1976).
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court--only to raise a new tack on appeal.2 95
ii. Trial Court Findings and Appellate Record Review
In addition to the Rule 56 duties imposed on the parties, the dis-
trict court is often said to have its own responsibility to delineate its
basis for granting summary judgment:
"Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on deci-
sions of motions under Rules 12 and 56," [and] their absence here
is not, of itself, fatal. Even so, "the parties are entitled to know the
reasons upon which [summary] judgment[s] . ..are based," if for
no other reason than to secure meaningful appellate review. Al-
though our prior admonitions have been precatory in character, we
have in practice insisted that district courts record-however infor-
mally-their reasons for entering summary judgment, at least
where their underlying holdings would otherwise be ambiguous or
inascertainable. 29 6
In a similar vein, a recent court has noted a conflict in the case
law on the question of whether the appellate court is to make an inde-
pendent review of the record to find a factual dispute which the appel-
lant has not pointed out. "Judges are not ferrets!," the court com-
plained, but searched the record anyway and reversed.297
iii. Appropriateness in Specific Applications
"Summary judgment is, of course, Damoclean and lethal. It can
serve as a quick sword untangling the Gordian knot of litigation. 29 8
295. See, e.g., DeBardeleben v. Cummings, 453 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1972).
The cases do not consistently require such care from the parties. Cf. infra note 279 and
accompanying text. But a party's failure to properly bring facts or legal theories to the
trial court's attention may constitute actual abandonment of the issues. See generally
infra notes 355-62 and accompanying text.
296. Hanson v. Aetna Life & Casualty, 625 F.2d 573, 575 (5th Cir. 1980)(cita-
tions omitted).
A recent Fifth Circuit case emphasized that these findings must be evaluated
under Rule 56(c), not the clear error rule of Rule 52(a). New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Baum, 707 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1983)(on rehearing).
297. Nicholas Acoustics & Specialty Co. v. H & M Const. Co., 695 F.2d 839,
847 (5th Cir. 1983).
298. Id. at 844. See also Whitaker v. Coleman, 115 F.2d 305, 307 (5th Cir.
1940).
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The mechanism is not to be used unless manifestly inappropriate. The
court has indicated that summary judgment is particularly inappropri-
ate as a general matter in certain classes of cases. For example,
"[o]rdinarily, summary disposition of Title VII cases is not favored,
especially on a 'potentially inadequate factual presentation.' "299 Sum-
mary judgment is normally-but not always-inappropriate when the
issues involve negligence or a determination of the reasonableness of
the parties' acts under the circumstances. 300
The Supreme Court has similarly stated: "We believe that sum-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litiga-
tion where motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in
the hands of the alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the
plot." 30 1 Nevertheless, lower courts have expressed their willingness to
affirm summary judgments in appropriate antitrust cases, especially
where tangible and objective issues are involved, though the procedure
is generally to be avoided.30 2 Other cases indicate that summary judg-
ment may not be proper in securities actions prior to completion of
discovery, 30 3 and the procedure may be cautiously applied where the
issue is novel or the case is complex.30 4 Critics blame this hesitance in
complex cases, as with liberality in other procedural vehicles, for clog-
ging the federal courts.30 5
c. Rule 41(b) Dismissal
In bench trials after the plaintiff concludes his case, the defendant
may move for dismissal of the action, "arguing "that upon the facts and
299. Jones v. Western Geophysical Co., 669 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir. 1982)(quot-
ing Logan v. General Fireproofing Co., 521 F.2d 881, 883 (4th Cir. 1971)), quoted in
Trevino v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397 (5th Cir. 1983).
300. See Gross v. Southern Ry. 414 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1969). Cf. Crum v. Con-
tinental Oil Co., 471 F.2d 784 (5th Cir. 1973)(allowing summary judgment); Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 282 (7th Cir.)(directed verdict on motive and
good faith), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
301. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962).
302. See Ferguson, 584 F.2d at 114. See also Sponsler, Fifth Circuit Sympo-
sium: Antitrust Law, 28 Loy. L. REV. 775, 785 (1982).
303. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 215, 218 (2d Cir. 1968)(en banc),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 906 (1969).
304. See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); Kennedy v.
Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948); 10 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §
2725 (1973).
305. See Carter, supra note 283, at 2.
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the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief." ' 6 The court may
defer the motion until the close of the case or, finding the evidence
insufficient, render judgment on the merits and make Rule 52(a) find-
ings.30 7 The trial court is said to weigh the evidence, even on a motion
made only after plaintiff has offered evidence.308
The substantive Rule 41(b) motion is roughly analogous to the di-
rected verdict motion offered at the same time in jury trials. But the
judge passing on a directed verdict or j.n.o.v. motion, to preserve the
jury function, must view the evidence in the light favoring the
nonmover. In nonjury cases under Rule 41(b), however, the judge is
said to be not so limited and may resolve credibility and evidentiary
conficts.309 As one recent court clarified: "Although the court disposed
of the [limitations] issue through the vehicle of a motion for directed
verdict, the issue was actually tried to the court as fact finder, and it
made, in effect, findings of fact and conclusions of law thereon. The
Boeing standard was therefore inapplicable. '310
d. New Trial
i. Discretion and General Applications
Rule 59 permits a trial court to grant a new trial, after motion or
on its own initiative, on any or all issues in a jury or bench trial.311
Common grounds on which such a motion is based include legal error
(e.g., in instructions or evidentiary calls), improper conduct (of judge,
attorney, or juror), new evidence, and verdict contrary to evidence. The
trial court's decision generally is committed to its discretion.312 For ex-
306. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b). Defendant can so move at the close of the case,
though then the court must render judgment anyway. See supra note 225 for dismissal
under Rule 41 on grounds other than insufficient evidence.
307. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
308. See Weissinger v. United States, 423 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1970)(en banc).
309. C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 96, at 645.
310. Emmons v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 701 F.2d 1122, 1119 (5th
Cir. 1983)(footnote omitted).
311. FED. R. Civ. P. 59. The motion "shall be served not later than 10 days after
the entry of judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 59(b). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d)(court
initiative) and 59(e)(alter or amend). See generally 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER,
supra note 66, §§ 2812, 2813 (1973). A 1966 amendment provides that the court may
act on grounds not stated in a motion. FED. R. Civ. P. 59(d).
312. See generally Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311 U.S. 243 (1940);
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ample, a motion for new trial based on inflammatory argument or other
improper remarks is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the
trial judge,313 reversible only for abuse.314 Justification for this defer-
ence echoes that which is given to other exercises of discretion:
The district judge . . was best able to measure the impact of im-
proper argument, the effect of the conduct on the jury, and the
results of his effort to control it. Our review is not only hindsight,
but is based on a written record with no ability to assess the impact
of the statement on the jury or to sense the atmosphere of the
courtroom.3 1 5
The courts may find that the earlier "failure to move for a mistrial is
also significant" in reviewing the propriety of the ultimate new trial
motion, since the party "[b]y doing so, and by acquiescing in the
court's corrective charge, . . . got a chance to see the verdict and then
to seek to overturn it" 31 -an advantage apparently viewed as unfair.
ii. Weight of the Evidence
Where an appeal is made from an order denying or granting a new
trial (the latter reviewed after a second trial) on the basis of legal er-
ror, the appellate court may simply review for such error. The more
Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 93 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 838
(1975); United States ex rel. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Bucon Constr. Co., 430 F.2d 420,
423 (5th Cir. 1970).
The Supreme Court has recently defined the proper factors and procedures the
trial court is to consider in determining a new trial motion for juror bias in civil cases.
See McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. 815
(1984). The Court in McDonough Power stated that a party seeking a new trial based
on juror prejudice or bias must demonstrate that the juror in question failed to answer
honestly a material question posed on voir dire. In addition, the party must show that a
honest answer would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause. See id. at
849-50.
313. Meyers v. Moody, 693 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1982). See Rosenberg, supra
note 13, at 178.
314. Caldadera v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 705 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1983).
315. See id. at 781-82.
316. Id. at 782 (footnote omitted). The courts also appear influenced by a
judge's quick or thorough limiting of prejudice by corrective instruction. See id. at 781-
82. Review generally may narrow to the question whether "the damage done by this
inflammatory argument was irreparable. . ." with the trial judge in the superior posi-
tion from which to evaluate prejudice. Id. at 781.
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difficult cases, however, involve evidence-weighing, necessarily involving
factual inquiry. The trial court's decision on a new trial motion for lack
of evidentiary support again is subject to review only for an abuse of
discretion. 17 In exercising this discretion in granting the motion, how-
ever, the trial court is warned not to merely substitute its view or
doubts about the evidence for those of the jury,3 18 though it is said that
the trial court on a new trial motion has the discretion to consider both
the weight of the evidence 31 9 and the credibility of witnesses. The stan-
dard by which the appellate court checks for abuse is the same as the
one guiding its exercise by the trial court: the trial court may not grant
a new trial unless the verdict is "against the great weight of the evi-
dence, ''s2 and the reviewing court will not affirm such a decision unless
the "great weight" line is broken. 321 Reversals have thus been ordered
where there is "no great weight of the evidence in any direction. 322
Although "[t] he 'great weight of the evidence' standard is not eas-
ily met, '323 or for that matter easily defined, 24 it is clear that the ver-
dict is not as safe under this test as where the verdict is challenged as a
matter of law under a j.n.o.v. motion; "the court has a wide discretion
in setting aside a verdict and granting a new trial even if the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence. '326 This discretion is allowed, even
in the face of the seventh amendment, possibly, because the verdict is
not flatly reversed-the parties instead just get a new jury. The circuit
has even, rarely, reversed trial court findings that a verdict is not
against the weight of the evidence.3 28 Nevertheless, the jury's verdict is
317. See, e.g., Saunders v. Chatham County Bd. of Comm'rs, 728 F.2d 1367
(11 th Cir. 1984); Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976). See
also McGuire v. Davis, 437 F.2d 570, 576 (5th Cir. 1971)("manifest abuse"); Weyer-
haeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 ("clear abuse").
318. See Conway v. Chemical Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 610 F.2d 360 (5th Cir.
1980).
319. See Robin v. Wilson Brothers Drilling, 719 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1983).
320. E.g., Taylor v. Fletcher Properties, Inc., 592 F.2d 244, 247 (5th Cir. 1979).
321. E.g., Narcisse v. Ill. Cent. Gulf RR Co., 620 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1980). See
also Weyerhaeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 (against "clear weight" or a miscarriage of jus-
tice). Some cases apply the "great weight" test without first setting it up as the stan-
dard by which the judge's discretion is directed and checked for abuse. E.g., Perricone,
704 F.2d at 1376.
322. Conway, 610 F.2d at 367.
323. Shows v. Jamison Bedding, Inc., 671 F.2d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1982).
324. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 197, § 95, at 639 (4th ed. 1983).
325. Abshire v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 668 F.2d 832, 837 (5th Cir. 1982).
326. United States v. Simmons, 346 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965); Georgia-Pacific
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given deference, especially where the issues are simple, the facts not
strongly disputed, and trial conduct not pernicious. 32 7
Although denial of a new trial motion is likewise said to be subject
to "abuse of discretion" review, it is clear that more deference in prac-
tice is given to the district judge when she agrees with the jury. Where
the "judge denies the motion and leaves undisturbed the jury's determi-
nation, all factors press in the direction of leaving the trial judge's rul-
ing undisturbed .... ,,311 Comity, common sense, and the seventh
amendment, of course, support this extra reluctance, though the dis-
tinction is at odds with the notion that the abuse test is a single or
uniform standard.329 Similarly, the like judgments of two successive ju-
ries is especially guarded; "courts rarely grant a new trial after two
verdicts upon the facts in favor of the same party. '330
iii. Conditional New Trial and Damages
The conditional grant of a new trial motion is governed by similar
language. In such a case the district court or even appellate court indi-
cates that it will order a new trial for damages unless the nonmoving
party will consent to a judicial reduction of damages. 331 In the federal
courts the issue is one of excessive damages-remedied by the condi-
tional remittitur vehicle-since additur, for inadequate damages, is
held to violate the seventh amendment.3 2 The trial judge applying re-
mittitur must actually offer the plaintiff a choice between reduction or
Corp. v. United States, 264 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1959). See also Caldarera, 705 F.2d
778 (5th Cir. 1983).
327. Perricone, 704 F.2d at 1381.
328. Massey v. Gulf Oil Corp., 508 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
838 (1975. But see supra note 326 and accompanying text.
329. See generally supra notes 258-61 and accompanying text.
330. Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U.S. 628, 631 (1890).
331. See generally Edwards, 512 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1975) (reversing both ver-
dict and judge's response and ordering new trial). See also Narcisse, 620 F.2d at 546;
11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 66, §§ 2815, 2816 (1973); Note, Remittitur
Review: Constitutionality and Efficiency in Liquidated and Unliquidated Damage
Cases, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 376 (1976).
332. See Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935); Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., 505
F.2d 665 (5th Cir. 1974). Although the circuits once split on the question whether a
party accepting remittitur may challenge the order on appeal, the Supreme Court now
holds that the order is not subject to appellate review when consented to, even if the
complaining party had given consent under protest. Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429
U.S. 648, 649 (1977).
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new trial; otherwise the appeals court must remand for that selec-
tion.333 Use of remittitur is, not surprisingly, reviewed under an "abuse
of discretion" standard. 3 4 The jury's determination, of course, is af-
forded deference, especially where the trial judge approves it.335 "The
jury's award is not to be disturbed unless it is entirely disproportionate
to the injury sustained. 338
The courts are not clear, in setting forth these principles, how the
judge's discretion accords with the traditional deference given jury ver-
dicts. It is, again, likely that "abuse" is found more rarely-or even
reviewed differently (if such is a real analytical distinction)-where the
judge agrees with the jury.337 Similarly, other courts33 8 do not clearly
distinguish among the language accompanying flat orders of new trial,
remittitur, and reversal of a jury's findings on damages. 339 Perhaps all
these situations could be summarized, beyond "abuse" language, as re-
quiring that all courts defer to the reasonable jury and the appellate
court in turn defer to the trial judge, especially where the judge's re-
view affirms the jury's determination. 40
333. Higgins v. Smith Int'l, 716 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1983).
334. See generally Sam's Style Shop v. Cosmos Broadcasting Corp., 694 F.2d
998 (5th Cir. 1982)(summarizing various former Fifth Circuit tests and language used
to determine abuse, finding abuse by any of the standards, and ordering conditional
new trial). Cf. Hill v. Nelson, 676 F.2d 1371 (11th Cir. 1982)(remittitur to stipulated
damages of parties).
Nevertheless, the trial judge may not reduce the award below the maximum rea-
sonable amount. Bonura, 505 F.2d at 669.
335. See Caldarera, 705 F.2d at 783-84 & n.15.
336. See id. at 784. Excessiveness of the verdict is judged from the base award,
e.g., before trebling. See Pope, 703 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1983). New trial on damages
may not be ordered unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.
Narcisse, 620 F.2d at 547.
337. See supra notes 328, 334-35 and accompanying text.
338. See, e.g., Pope, 703 F.2d at 208.
339. See supra note 172.
340. Whether the issue of damages is reviewed on its own terms or after initial
trial judge review, it is said that "an examination of the [former] Fifth Circuit cases in
this field reveals only rare instances in which the Court felt bound to set aside a jury
award for its excessiveness." Perricone, 630 F.2d at 319. But where the trial judge
exercises his discretion to reduce an award, abuse is found "only when it appears that
the jury's original verdict was clearly within the universe of possible awards which are
supported by the evidence." Bonura, 505 F.2d at 670 (emphasis in original).
[Vol. 9
66
Nova Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [1985], Art. 1
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol9/iss2/1
Eleventh Circuit Standards of Review
iv. Discretion versus Law: J.N.O.V. Compared
Despite the blending in some damages cases, the court has distin-
guished generally between the new trial situation and the j.n.o.v. mo-
tion, which often accompanies a new trial motion. As one Fifth Circuit
case summarized, in rejecting the argument that failure to move for a
directed verdict precludes granting a new trial on evidence:
In passing a motion for a directed verdict, or for a judgment n.o.v.,
the court does not exercise discretion, but decides a pure question
of law, that is, whether the evidence, considered in the light most
favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, affords
substantial support for a verdict in his favor. . . . In passing on a
motion for a new trial, the court may and should exercise a sound
discretion, and its ruling thereon will not be reviewed in an appel-
late court in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.34'
This distinction, the court added, "was firmly embedded in the common
law" and recognized by the former Fifth and other circuits.3 42
Some courts also distinguish between j.n.o.v. and new trial in the
context of evidence considered, noting that the trial court in passing on
a new trial motion may retroactively strike erroneously admitted evi-
dence and then gauge the jury's performance as if the evidence were
not before it. This procedure is not allowed in the directed verdict or
j.n.o.v. context.3 41
e. Reopen Judgment
Under Rule 60(b) the district court may, on motion, order relief
from a judgment or order on grounds ranging from mistake or excusa-
341. Weyerhaeuser, 430 F.2d at 423 (footnotes omitted). The trial judge may
grant a new trial if in her opinion the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence
or will cause an injustice, even though substantial evidence prevents granting a j.n.o.v.
Id.
342. Id. at 424 (footnote omitted). For another comparison of new trial motion
with other motions, including directed verdict, involuntary dismissal, and summary
judgment, see 5A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 25, 50.03. Two cases which, like
many appeals, also involve multiple trial motions are Comfort Trane, 592 F.2d 1373
(5th Cir. 1979), and Spurlin v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1976).
343. See Sumitomo Bank v. Products Promotions, Inc., 717 F.2d 215, 218 (5th
Cir. 1983). See also notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
19851
67
Childress: Standards of Review in Eleventh Circuit Civil Appeals
Published by NSUWorks, 1985
Nova Law Journal
ble neglect to fraud or general fairness.344 When a legal error is alleged
the judge acts within his discretion.345 The circuit has also allowed dis-
cretion under Rule 60(b) to consider new evidence346 or to reinstate a
dismissed complaint.347
D. Special Principles and Applications
1. Panel Stare Decisis
One application of the general rule of stare decisis, in which prior
decisional law provides the governing "rule of law" in subsequent ap-
peals,3 48 is the Eleventh Circuit principle of "panel stare decisis."
Under this rule, each three-judge panel in the circuit is said to be
"without power to overrule a decision of another panel. That task falls
solely to the full Court sitting en banc.'"3 4' But subsequent panels can
also reject precedent, even en banc precedent, under a superseding Su-
preme Court ruling or statutory change.350
A sticky dilemma is presented by conflicting panel cases, cases
which theoretically should not develop if the panel stare decisis princi-
ple is maintained. In such a situation, later courts are caught in a jam:
344. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Rule 60(a) governs clerical errors, Rule 59(e) pro-
vides for alteration or amendment of judgment within ten days, and Rule 52(b) allows
amendment of findings, as is discussed in the Advisory Committee Notes, 1946
Amendment, to Rule 60(b).
345. See Fackelman v. Bell, 564 F.2d 734, 736 (5th Cir. 1977).
346. Steelcase, Inc. v. Delwood Furniture Co., 578 F.2d 74, 77 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 960 (1978). The court left the motion to the trial judge's discretion
but reviewed the implicit finding of due diligence supporting it for clear error. Id.
347. Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1981) (abuse of
discretion).
348. Cf. Edwards v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 720 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir.
1983) (discussing general rule that appellate court must apply decisional law in effect at
the time it renders its subsequent opinion, plus exceptions that allow retroactive legal
application).
A similar principle, the "law of the case" doctrine, makes controlling prior deci-
sions in earlier appeals of the same line of litigation.
349. Ford v. United States, 618 F.2d 357, 361 (5th Cir. 1980). Accord Bonner v.
City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11 th Cir. 1981)(en banc); Hernandez v. City
of Lafayette, 643 F.2d 1188, 1192-93 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907
(1982); Davis v. Estelle, 529 F.2d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 1976)(controls even where later
panel perceives error in the precedent). This rule controls in the circuit, of course, until
the en banc court rejects it.
350. See, e.g., Davis, 529 F.2d at 441.
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"[W]e cannot pay heed to one line of precedent without disregarding
the other, and we lack the authority to overrule one line at the other's
expense." '351 In response, some judges will choose the "longer estab-
lished and more extensive line of precedent, 352 while others follow a
relatively lonely case "because it is the first of our cases to consider the
problem before us, has never been specifically overruled, and is in our
view better-reasoned. .. .
In the final analysis, the latter factor-which precedent is
right-probably controls over such apparently-malleable rules of
thumb as "first case" or "latest case. '3 54 Such conflicts are, of course,
appropriate fodder for the en banc court, though panels seem to avoid
that drastic course where one line of precedent is overwhelmingly ap-
plied or "correct," such that a conflict is in effect merely a couple of
aberrational cases.
2. Review of Issues Not Raised
The courts have developed the general rule that appellants may
not assert facts or theories on appeal which were not urged before the
district court. In some cases the rule is applied strictly, since "[t]he
time for sorting out theories begins long before the filing of a notice of
appeal. ' 355 The trial court "is not to be trapped" by the appellant's
earlier tactical decision or abandonment.356 The rule may have its
strictest application where the assertion first raised on appeal is factual
or reflects a conscious waiver.357 In some cases, "additional facts would
have been developed in the trial court had the new theory been
presented there; in that case, judicial economy is served and prejudice
351. Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1354 n. 10 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
352. Id. at 1354 (footnote omitted).
353. See United States v. Michelena-Orovio, 702 F.2d 496, 501 (5th Cir.), rev'd
in part, 719 F.2d 738 (1983)(en banc).
354. See also Castillo, 704 F.2d at 187 n.12 (citing "substantial line of author-
ity" but also independently analyzing value of each position).
355. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. v. Bryce Street Apts., Ltd., 703 F.2d 904,
908 (5th Cir. 1983). See also Lumpkin v. Ricketts, 551 F.2d 680 (5th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 957 (1978); Guerra v. Manchester Terminal Corp., 498 F.2d 641
(5th Cir. 1974). But formal exceptions to the trial court's erroneous ruling or order are
not necessary. FED. R. Civ. P. 46.
356. DeBardeleben v. Cummings, 453 F.2d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 1972).
357. See id. at 324-26. See also Compass Insurance Co. v. Vanguard Insurance
Co., 649 F.2d 331 (5th Cir. 1981).
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is avoided by binding the parties to the facts presented and the theories
argued below. '3 58
Despite the strict warnings, however, many cases eventually go on
to decide the new issue. The general rule is not jurisdictional but is
"one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exer-
cised on the facts of the individual cases. '3 59 A common exception is
usually made where the newly raised issue concerns a pure question of
law and a refusal to consider it would result in a miscarriage of jus-
tice.360 Other factors which make courts more willing to consider virgin
issues include consent by the other party36' and matters for which the
proper resolution is beyond real doubt.362
Similar rules apply in other "waiver" situations. For example, it is
said to be impermissible to raise an issue for the first time in a reply
brief since the appellee then gets no chance to respond.3 3 The appel-
late court need not address issues which should have been raised by
cross-appeal. 364 Of course, it is likely that these "waivers" will them-
selves be waived by an appeals court finding it necessary to address an
issue critical to the litigation or the decisional law. The appeals court
generally has a "duty to apply the correct law. '3 65
358. Higginbotham v. Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762, 768 n.10 (5th Cir. 1976).
359. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121 (1976), quoted in Nilsen v. City of
Moss Point, 674 F.2d 379, 387 n.13 (5th Cir. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 701 F.2d
556 (1983)(en banc). See Thorton v. Schweiker, 663 F.2d 1312, 1315 (5th Cir. 1981).
360. The language and situation is, of course, reminiscent of "plain error" princi-
ples applied in other settings. See supra text accompanying notes 187, 199, 277. But
here an "injustice" jutifies review at all rather than providing the "standard of review,"
level of deference, or amount of error that need be shown.
361. Nilsen, 674 F.2d at 387 n.13 ("absence of a strong argument from the ap-
pellee"). Another important factor is the full opportunity of each party to address the
issue. Id.
362. See Singleton, 428 U.S. at 121.
363. See 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3974, at 428 (1977). Cf. Weingart v. Allen & O'Hara,
Inc., 654 F.2d 1096, 1101 (5th Cir. 1981)(rule that appeals court will consider only
errors of which appellant specifically complains is not inflexible).
364. It is often said that no cross-appeal is necessary to urge alternative theories
in support of the lower court's judgment. See French v. Estelle, 692 F.2d 1021, 1024 n.
5 (5th Cir. 1982).
365. Empire Life Ins. Co. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 334 (5th Cir.
1972)(emphasis in original).
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3. Harmless Error
Even where the district court or jury has made an error of law or
fact in the situations discussed throughout this article, the Eleventh
Circuit does not automatically reverse the lower decision. Rule 61 pro-
vides the general principle of "harmless error" applicable in civil
actions:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence
and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or
omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting
a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying,
or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take
such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial jus-
tice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substan-
tial rights of the parties.386
The circuit has framed this test for prejudice as a basic question:
"We must determine whether, assuming the action under review to
have been erroneous, was it really harmful to the complaining
party? 13 17 The courts add as a corollary that if the result below is cor-
rect it must be affirmed, even though the district court relied on a
wrong ground or gave a wrong reason. 68 In applying these principles,
then, every "standards of review" issue may also involve the question,
either preliminary or ultimate, of whether any potential error would
effect a substantial unfairness upon the parties. 6
4. Habeas Appeals
Habeas corpus cases on appeal, though involving elements and is-
366. FED. R. Civ. P. 61. See generally supra note 187. Cf. Herman v. Hess Oil,
524 F.2d 767, 771 (3d Cir. 1975)(invited error).
367. Tugwell v. A.F. Klaveness & Co., 320 F.2d 866, 868 (5th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 951 (1964).
368. See, e.g., Securities & Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80,
88 (1943); Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937).
369. Some errors are per se reversible, especially where constitutional issues or
judicial prophylactic measures are concerned. E.g., Rovinsky v. McKasle, 722 F.2d
197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1984)(denial of right to public trial warrants reversal even with-
out prejudice). See generally Harryman v. Estelle, 616 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1980)(en
banc).
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sues of the criminal law, are of course structured as civil appeals, and
the federal district judge acts as a fact finder or hearing-master as he
would in the usual civil proceeding. The court's findings of fact, for
example, are subject to the clear error test of Rule 52(a). 370 The
habeas case in the lower court also often involves referral to a magis-
trate for preliminary consideration. 7'
Habeas appeals from district court review of state court convic-
tions necessarily involve two levels of federal appellate review. In such
a case the federal circuit court generally gives state court decisions and
written findings a "presumption of correctness. '37 2 But the two levels
may clash when the federal district court's fact findings are contrary to
state court findings. Presumably appellate review giving a "presump-
tion of correctness" is about equal to review for "clear error," 373 so that
wherd district court differs from state court the tug of appellate pre-
sumptions is from opposite, but equally strong, directions. If the first
level of deference-to state courts-is to have meaning, it appears that
the "clear error" deference given the district court may have to give
way some. That rationale may, of course, underlie the "glosses" on the
clearly erroneous rule the former Fifth Circut developed for cases built
on documentary evidence, 374 since habeas cases often run through the
federal courts on paper.
The Supreme Court set out in Jackson v. Virginia375 the habeas
standard for sufficiency of evidence. Allowing all reasonable inferences
to be drawn in the government's favor, 76 the appeals court must affirm
if "any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
370. See supra notes 23, 24, 31-44 and accompanying text. See generally Wat-
kins, 655 F.2d at 1353 n.9 (discussing fact findings and characterizations for such
situations as adequate representation, sufficiency of evidence, identification procedures,
and multiple representation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 949 (1982).
371. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
372. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1982), Marshall v. Longberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983);
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981). Findings on mixed fact-law questions generally
do not benefit from the presumption. E.g., Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 341-42
(1980)(attorney did not engage in multiple representation). A state's interpretation of
its own law controls. See Skipper v. Wainwright, 444 U.S. 974 (1979).
373. The early equity standard of "presumptively correct" was adopted for both
law and equity in the rule 52(a) "clear error" standard. See supra text accompanying
note 20. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of the United States, -U.S.-.,
104 S. Ct. 1949, 1959 (1984).
374. See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
375. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
376. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
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the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. '377 It could be argued that Jack-
son intended even less review discretion to the federal courts in state
habeas cases than with the sufficiency test for direct appeals, or at least
that even more deference should be given the states. But the appeals
courts do not generally perceive such a distinction, often applying Jack-
son on direct appeals.378
III. Conclusion
Appellate courts seldom do their magic from an empty hat. The
work of the lower courts-sometimes including state courts-or admin-
istrative agency frequently defines how the appeals judges look at the
litigation and how far they can go in making law. What one court re-
cently admonished is often true: "We take this occasion to repeat: we
do not sit to hear cases de novo. ' '379
But in the final analysis the appeals court's duty is to make a cor-
rect decision. In frequent situations the judges are ultimately given
"plain error" review, which means that at a minimum they can reverse
for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Thus, the Eleventh Circuit judge,
regardless of the first-level standard of review, need not preside over a
substantial injustice. In the long run, then, standards of review can be
powerful case-defining and power-assigning tools, but they should not
serve as a Dickens-like limit to the judges' sense of fairness. It has
worked out that in practice the avoidance of a rank injustice is indeed a
legitimate ultimate standard of review. At the same time, regardless of
the substantive standard of review or the transparent nature of the
lower court's error, the appellate court may not reverse unless the ap-
pellant's substantial rights are abridged. 380 Judge Frank once noted the
irony of the deference levels in the standards-of-review notion:
A wag might say that a verdict is entitled to high respect because
the jurors are inexperienced in finding facts, an administrative find-
ing is given high respect because the administrative officers are spe-
cialists (guided by experts) in finding a particular class of facts,
but, paradoxically, a trial judge's finding has far less respect be-
cause he is blessed neither with jurors' inexperience nor adminis-
377. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
378. See, e.g., United States v. Shaw, 701 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1983).
379. Commercial Standard, 703 F.2d at 908.
380. See Meguire v. Corwine, 101 U.S. 108, 110-12 (1879). See also supra notes
366-68 and accompanying text.
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trative officers' expertness.38
Of course, the courts have added to this straightforward observa-
tion with plenty of defining texts and minute categorization of special
situations. But even at a high level, at any rate, it is a wise "wag," as
practicing attorney, who keeps the various standards straight and uses
them-along with any ambiguities and inconsistencies-to frame the
issues in the client's best light. The wise court, too, will sort out the
checkpoints and follow them, keeping in mind the final test in either
direction for substantial fairness. Meanwhile, the profession as a whole,
joined by legal commentators, may remember the ubiquitous nature of
the standards of review and further the inquiry into their value and
fairness, not just in each case, but upon the legal system as a whole.
381. Orvis v. Higgins, 180 F.2d 537, 540 n.7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
810 (1950).
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